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Abstract
Since the eruption of the Mediterranean crisis, European states have taken a tougher
stance on admitting refugees and asylum seekers despite the fact that Europe is the
original architect of the international humanitarian regime. This shift from a historically
Open Europe to the Fortress Europe is particularly pronounced in Germany. Accordingly,
this thesis explores why Germany has suggested more restrictive policies toward the
Mediterranean refugees today when it had responded generously during the Indochinese
crisis. I argue that Germany’s differential responses to the Indochinese and
Mediterranean refugee crises reflect its construction of the foreign groups as either assets
or liabilities to national identity. As such, the Vietnamese were positive constructs in
Germany’s nation building process, whereas the Mediterranean refugees are conceived as
potential threats to the maintenance of the re-unified German nation. This study
concludes that Germany should consider long-term and short-term effects on the nation
when drafting asylum policies.
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Refugees, Migrants, and Terrorists: German National Identity and the Social
Construction of Vietnamese and Mediterranean Boat People
Since the eruption of the Mediterranean crisis earlier this year, European states
have taken a tougher stance on admitting refugees and asylum seekers despite the fact
that Europe stands as the original architect of the international humanitarian regime. This
shift from a historically Open Europe to the Fortress Europe is particularly pronounced in
Germany. Accordingly, this thesis explores why Germany has suggested more restrictive
policies toward the Mediterranean refugees today when it responded generously to the
Indochinese crisis in the late twentieth century. I argue that Germany’s differential
responses to the Indochinese and Mediterranean refugee crises reflect its construction of
the foreign groups as either assets or liabilities to national identity. As such, the
Vietnamese were positive constructs in Germany’s nation building process, whereas the
Mediterranean refugees are conceived as potential threats to the maintenance of the reunified German nation.
The study’s overarching theme questions the extent in which the right of asylum
applies to unwanted refugees, those who are rejected by possible countries of refuge or
whose presence are considered public threats. Specifically, I focus on Germany’s
preferential treatment of the Vietnamese refugee group from four decades ago in contrast
to its present policies toward the Mediterranean refugee group. I postulate that
Germany’s wavering reactions and reservations to the Mediterranean crisis are suggestive
of the government’s construction of the people onboard as security threats, rather than
genuine refugees fleeing war, violence, and persecution. The rest of the introductory
chapter concludes with a brief historical overview of the two refugees crises followed by
a theoretical section that operationalizes key terms and concepts used in the study.
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Chapter 2 builds upon the previous chapter and problematizes the refugee identity
within the nation-state framework. In this regard, Chapter 2 explores the scholarship on
migration, asylum admissions policies, and state sovereignty. This chapter also examines
the securitization literature to show how political elites in democratic societies like
Germany manipulate public opinion on migration related issues. Consequently, Chapter 3
applies the social construction of refugees and the securitization of migration to the
process of nation building and identity formation. Accordingly, Chapter 3 addresses the
various uses of refugee groups by Germany. Chapter 4 concludes the study with
suggestions for why German political elites should reconstruct Mediterranean refugees as
positive influences on national identity given that the refugees can help to sustain
Germany’s (and Europe’s) slowing economy and aging population.
The first section focuses on the Vietnamese boat people as assets to the creation
(or renewal) of the German national identity post-World War II. Thus, the Vietnamese
people, whether they were refugees or not, were vital to Germany’s post-Hitler
foundation myth of the nation. The Vietnamese boat people in the West became a part of
the German nation building project during the Cold War, which allow the new Germans
to distance themselves from the Third Reich. Contrary to the Vietnamese, Europe’s
current boat people are depicted as political risks, destabilizing rather than maintaining
the re-unified German nation. West-East differences have re-emerged in the midst of
Islamophobia and anti-immigrant rallies; thus threatening to divide the German people
again, 25 years after re-unification. To further elaborate my claims, the second section
explores Germany’s current boat people—clearly bona fide refugees too—as terrorists.
The Mediterranean boat people are proclaimed as liabilities and “potential threat[s] to the
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state’s territorial [and symbolic] claim to authority” (Bui, 2003, p. 13). Thus, the
Mediterranean boat people are contributing to the fragmentation of a collective German
national identity.
Theoretically, all refugees, migrants, stateless and displaced persons pose as
anomalies that challenge the normative political order but especially in today’s (hyper)
globalized and security-conscious world (see Casey, 2009; Dauvergne, 2004, 2007;
Holborn, 1975, p. 5). However, the refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean are
unfortunately caught in the post-9/11 war on terror hysteria, which enables states to evade
their obligations to international humanitarianism and asylum. Ultimately, the
Mediterranean boat people are misperceived as threats to the legitimacy of states, more so
than the Vietnamese, because globalization has significantly eased people’s mobility
across borders and the September 11, 2001, attacks have heightened the securitization of
international politics including migration and refugee issues.
While there are practical limitations to how many refugees and migrants any host
state can accommodate, this is not an excuse for Germany to evade its humanitarian
obligations and build walls to restrict refugee movement. Rather than criminalizing the
Mediterranean refugees and asylum seekers for choosing a safer and better life, Germany
is in a position to lead the international community in resolving the current human
exodus. In terms of policy implications, this thesis concludes that the securitization, or
presentation, of the Mediterranean refugees as existential threats to Germany’s sociopolitical order is a deliberate act by governing elites and decision makers (Wæver, 2000).
Thus European elites locate their fear of “an Islamic invasion” in the boatloads of
refugees drowning to get on EU soil. If there are any truths to this impending Islamic
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invasion, it will come from ISIS and not from those fleeing its jihadist ideology. By not
expanding the Willkommenskultur (welcoming culture) to people from the Middle East
and Africa, Europe has traded its humanitarian tradition for a false sense of security.
The Mediterranean & Indochinese Boat Crises
To better facilitate the latter analysis, the following sections provide an overview
of the situation in the Mediterranean Sea and Germany’s reactions to the crisis in
Indochina and the resolutions that brought an end to the flow of asylum seekers.
Subsequently, the historical review of the Indochinese crisis contextualizes how the
current Mediterranean tragedy fits the character of a bona fide refugee crisis despite
public discourse that says otherwise (Edwards, 2015; Malone, 2015).
The Mediterranean Crisis
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported over 2,300 people
have died crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe from January to August of 2015. The
Mediterranean passage is among the most hostile migratory routes around the world
claiming about 72% of the global total deaths. So far this year, an estimated 3,4401
people have either died or are missing en route to Europe most of whom are refugees
from the Middle East and Africa. Notwithstanding, the international community’s
disapproval of the October 2013 incident when 366 migrants died off the coast of
Lampedusa that led to the Italian government’s search and rescue operation Mare
Nostrum (Our Sea), Europe has largely ignored the situation in the Mediterranean—until
April 19, 2015, when 800 people died as a ship sank off the coast of Libya (Deutsche
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The United Nations has up-to-date information on the Mediterranean crisis via the
Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response portal: http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php
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Welle [DW], 2015a; Economist, 2015b).2 Now that “Europe’s boat people” has become a
“moral and political disgrace,”3 the European Union (EU) is forced to re-examine its
existing policy on asylum seekers and migrants.
Among the immediate actions of the European Commission President JeanClaude Juncker’s 10-point plan is a quota system which seeks to disperse humanitarian
responsibilities more evenly across EU Member States and thus, relieving Italy, Greece,
and Malta as they are the first entry ports for migrants crossing the Mediterranean
(European Commission, 2015a). The quota plan represents a positive step toward
possible refugee burden-sharing initiatives and strengthens EU solidarity, but several
countries have rejected the idea. According to the United Kingdom, the quota mandate,
like search and rescue missions, are righteous operations but they are also unintentional
pull factors that incentivizes more people to risk their lives and human traffickers to
continue their business. “We cannot do anything which encourages more people to make
these perilous journeys – or which makes it easier for the gangs responsible for their
misery,” British Interior Minister Theresa May alleged, “That is why the UK will not
participate in a mandatory system of resettlement or relocation” (as cited in DW, 2015b).
France,4 Slovakia, Estonia, and Hungary are also strong opponents of the EU
Commission’s migrant quota plan (RT, 2015). The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor
Orban defamed it as “absurd, bordering on insanity” (as cited in DW, 2015c). According

2

The exact death toll is unknown but the reported number ranges between 400 to 950 people.
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From The Economist, April 23, 2015, print edition cover.
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France opposes the quota system for different reasons than Hungary, Estonia, and Slovakia.
French PM Manuel Valls said: “I am against the introduction of quotas for migrants. This has never been in
line with French proposals. Asylum is a right granted by international standards applied to all countries of
the European Union. It is also for this reason that the number of beneficiaries cannot be the subjected to
quotas.” See RT, 2015.
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to Orban, “Member states have to protect their own borders. I think it’s insane to propose
letting in all immigrants to Europe.”
Considering the unpopularity of the quota scheme, it is not surprising that EU
ministers have approved the military intervention against human traffickers as proposed
by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini. These “targeted
interventions” involve sinking vessels and other assets used by human smugglers
operating in Libya once migrants are rescued (Riegert, 2015). Diplomats in Brussels have
emphasized the “no boots on the ground” rhetoric despite concerns about potential
military spillover in Libya. Ultimately however, the militarization of migrant issues is the
EU’s subtle way of preventing more migration to its Fortress. According to Michael
Diedring, the secretary general of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE),
the solution to eradicating human traffickers is promoting legal channels for migration,
not bombing their escape routes: “It is ironic that people fleeing from war and
persecution are being met with more of the same” (Nelsen, 2015).
In spite of the Commission’s calls for solidarity in “tackling this historical
challenge,” the belated European Agenda on Migration has triggered more divisions than
cohesion among Member States (European Commission, 2015b). While Europe’s boat
people crisis intensifies as more people are dying at an unprecedented rate, Member
States remain ever more aloof to the plight of the migrants. Regardless of the EU’s
internal politics (e.g., Greece’s debt drama, economic sanctions against Russia over
Ukraine, etc.), Europe is a beacon of hope and stability for Syrians, Afghanis, and
Eritreans escaping war, persecution, and lawlessness in their home countries. Likewise,
The Economist (2015a) declared Europe a utopia, an “enclave of stability and wealth in
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an ocean of violence,” and as long as Europe remains a utopia, “You cannot stop the tide
of refugees” (p.11).
As the original architects of the international refugee regime, European states
(Western Europe in particular) have accepted a sizeable portion of the world’s refugees in
the past. The Indochina crisis remains a constant example of Europe’s capabilities and
commitments to help those in need of protection. Since the eruption of the Mediterranean
migrant crisis (Malone, 2015), European leaders may have forgotten that history or as the
Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights observed, “Europe’s current
response to refugees shows unmistakable backsliding on that commitment […] it is
tearing apart what remains of the European project and its façade of solidarity” (as cited
in Muiznieks, 2015).
The Indochinese Crisis
It is perplexing why Germany is not more welcoming to the Mediterranean boat
people as they were with the Indochinese refugee crisis despite the similarities between
the two refugee movements. In 1979, Barry Wain wrote, “Indochina is bleeding ... on a
scale the world has not experienced since World War II” (p. 160). The Indochina crisis
persisted for nearly three decades, which included three series of interrelated wars and
left more than three million people displaced from their homes (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2000, p. 79). Following the fall of Saigon on
April 30, 1975, nearly 12,050 Vietnamese fled by boat to neighboring areas such as
Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines by the end of that year (UNHCR,
2000, p. 81). The boat exodus from Vietnam expanded dramatically by mid-1977
following the country’s re-unification as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in July 1976.
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In September 1978 alone, the UNHCR reported that some 7,300 Vietnamese had made
their way to the shores of first asylum countries (Robinson, 1998, p. 27).
While the UNHCR was hesitant to call the first wave (1975) of the Indochina
exodus as a refugee crisis, the United States, for obvious reasons, spearheaded the
internationalization of the Indochina refugee crisis. For the United States, the
Vietnamese living in temporary housing and camps in Thailand were not displaced
because of war but refugees fleeing from war (Robinson, 1998, p. 22). The Americans’
strategic emphasis on refugee was part of their plea to renew the international
community’s commitments in Southeast Asia. Robinson (1998) describes it as another
way to “further ‘internationalize’ the burden-sharing” (p. 52).
Once the international community realized the significance of the “floating
coffins” flooding out of Vietnam, the response was “saving refugee lives and finding
permanent homes for them” abroad (Wain, 1979, p. 160). Even before South Vietnam
capitulated, the Ford administration resettled about 140,000 South Vietnamese as
American military personnel withdrew from the country (UNHCR, 2000, p. 81). Perhaps,
the pinnacle of American guilt (or America’s greatest achievement from the Vietnam
trauma, depending on one’s perspective) was Operation Babylift (April 3-27, 1975) when
over three thousand Vietnamese children, not all orphans, were rescued and placed in
international adoption agencies (see Sachs, 2010). Aside from U.S. involvement, the
international community was highly proactive in devising solutions to halt the refugee
crisis in Southeast Asia (SEA) despite explicit evidences of intricate human smuggling
networks (collectively known as the “Rust Bucket Tours, Inc.,” see the Southern Cross
and the Hai Hong), political manipulation and foul play from the Vietnamese government
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who actively participated in the lucrative refugee-smuggling business, and neighboring
SEA states’ refusals to accommodate boat refugees (Robinson, 1998).
In retrospect, the Indochinese refugee crisis is canonized in historical memory for
the comprehensive resolutions that resulted from the two groundbreaking international
conferences in Geneva (Crépeau, 2015; Robinson, 1998). Sixty-five governments
attended the first conference on Indochinese refugees in July 1979, including China,
Japan, the Soviet Union, all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and practically all of Western Europe. While no formal concessions were
made in terms of asylum, the 1979 meeting stressed the importance of the nonrefoulement principle. However, in order to persuade first asylum countries (mainly
Malaysia and Indonesia) to open their shores to asylum seekers, a quid pro quo was made
where ASEAN countries agreed to grant temporary asylum in exchange for third-country
resettlement—“an open shore for an open door.”
Although the open shore for an open door agreement did not resolve the
Indochinese refugee crisis, its significance lay in the willingness of global north countries
to bargain with countries of the global south to resolve a regional crisis. This degree of
international cooperation endured to the second conference in 1989, which led to the
adoption of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) that eventually ended the flow of
Vietnamese asylum seekers. The CPA was “one of the first examples of a situation where
the country of origin became a key player, together with other countries and actors from
both within and outside the region, in helping to resolve a major refugee crisis”
(UNHCR, 2000, p. 84).
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Aside from the CPA, other innovative solutions included resettlement initiatives
such as the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) signed between the UNHCR and the
Vietnamese government in May 1979 (Kumin, 2008) and anti-piracy campaigns in the
South China Sea to protect boat refugees from the “cruelty, brutality and inhumanity that
go beyond […] murder, robbery, and rape” (UNHCR, 2000, p. 87). There were also
search and rescue efforts such as the Disembarkation Resettlement Offers (DISERO) in
1979 and its later companion program Rescue at Sea Resettlement Offers (RASRO)5 in
1985 as well as elaborate re-integration projects for returnees. As a result of the
international community’s commitments and support from the UNHCR, the Indochinese
refugee crisis came to a “relatively humane end” at the turn of the twenty-first century
(UNHCR, 2000, p. 103).
Out of the 3 million plus people who fled from their countries, about 2.5 million
were resettled and around half a million were repatriated. These figures, however, do not
include unregistered trans-border movements or the “tens of thousands who suffered and
died along the way as a result of piracy, pushbacks, drownings [sic], banditry and abuse”
(Robinson, 1998, p. 2). By 1997, 92% of the total Indochinese resettlement went to the
United States, Australia, Canada, and France (see Table 1). In terms of the Vietnamese
boat people, roughly 88% of them settled in those four countries as well. Not
undeservingly given its involvement in the Second Indochina War, the United States took
in 65% of the total Vietnamese refugees by 1997 and remained the largest contributor to
resettlement initiatives (Robinson, 1998, p. 54).

5

See UNHCR, Rescue of asylum-seekers in distress at sea, No. 38 (18 October 1985). Retrieved
from http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c4358.html; UNHCR, Problems relating to the rescue of asylum-seekers
at sea, EC/SCP/42 (8 July 1985). Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68cbc20.html.
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Australia, Canada, and the United States are generally recognized as “nations of
immigrants” since immigration represents for these countries the “founding myth” of a
nation. Higher refugee resettlement rates in the United States, Canada, and Australia are
partially due to the historical significance of immigration to the nation building process.
Table 1: Indochinese Resettlement & Repatriation, 1975-1997
Resettlement Country
United States
Australia
Canada
France
United Kingdom
Germany, FR
Total Resettlement
Total Repatriation

Vietnamese
Land
Boat
883,317
402,382
157,863
108,808
163,415
100,012
46,348
21,421
24,267
19,329
28,916
15,489
1,381,179* 717,918
109,322

Cambodians

Laotians

Total

152,748
17,605
21,489
38,598
381
998
250,884*
391,271

251,334
17,605
17,274
34,236
346
1,706
324,107
23,891

1,287,399
185,707
202,178
119,182
24,994
31,620
1,956,170
524,484

* Includes arrivals under the Orderly Departure Program (ODP).
Source: UNHCR & Robinson (1998)

Canada’s exceptional contributions to the Indochinese refugees, which included
direct government involvement and private sponsorships from ordinary citizens, earned it
the 1986 Nansen Refugee Award. Robinson (1998) notes that this was the first time the
UNHCR awarded the Nansen Medal “not to an individual, a government, or an
organization, but to an entire people” (p. 142 [emphasis added]). However, analysts have
argued that Canada’s commitments to the Indochinese refugees were motivated by the
“obligation to demonstrate token solidarity with the United States” (Adelman, 1991, p.
198; Robinson, 1998).
Unlike Canada, the Australian immigration history throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries was highly Eurocentric and featured racist policies (e.g., “White
Australia”) that aimed to “increase the population without changing its dominantly
European composition” (Grant, 1979, p. 179). Although Australians bear some
responsibility for the crisis in Vietnam since they fought alongside the Americans,
11

Australia’s initial responses to the boat refugees were “somewhat token and piecemeal”
allocating no more than 1,000 resettlements per year between 1976 and 1977 (Robinson,
1998, p. 152). By the middle of 1978, refugee resettlement was less of an issue, as
Australia had become a first asylum country like its ASEAN neighbors with a total of 51
boats carrying more than 2,000 Vietnamese disembarking on the Australian coastline
(Robinson, 1998, p. 152). Therefore, to control illegal migration, the Australian
government pursued legal opportunities and formalized procedures in the early 1980s for
asylum seekers and refugee resettlement (Robinson, 1998; Smit, 2010).
With regard to resettlement to Europe from 1975 to 1997, France was ranked top
third-country resettlement for Indochinese refugees at around 6% followed by the Federal
Republic of Germany with 1.62% and the United Kingdom with 1.28% (see Table 1).
Given French imperialism in Indochina (67 years), the surprisingly low 6% is partly
because the French government blamed the U.S. for the fall of Vientiane (Laos), Phnom
Penh, and Saigon; and thus, the Indochinese exodus was “considered largely a
responsibility of the Americans” (Robinson, 1998, p. 144). Moreover, the French
government retained diplomatic ties with Vietnam, unlike its Western allies, even when
Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979. Therefore, France’s decision to restrict resettlement
quotas reflects their wish to “draw closer to their former colonies rather than freeze them
out” (Robinson, 1998, p. 145).
Similar to Australia, Britain’s involvement in the Vietnamese boat crisis was out
of necessity and pragmatism. As a country of emigration with many British citizens
moving to other members of the Commonwealth, immigration offers almost nothing to
the creation of the British nation-state. Thus, Britain’s resettlement efforts were
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geopolitical. Scholars have argued that the real reason behind Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher’s calls for the 1979 Geneva conference on Indochinese refugees was to relieve
Britain’s crown colony of Hong Kong from the massive influx of boat people (British
Refugee Council [BRC], 1984; Davis, 1991; Robinson, 1998; Somerset, 1983).
Dialectics of Refugeehood
Although international law stipulates common understandings of refugees,
asylum, and migration, a crisis of semantics persists because it benefits the state when
drafting asylum policies. Contrary to mainstream media and public opinion, refugees,
asylum seekers, and migrants are distinctive groups of people in the technical sense. As
for the Mediterranean tragedy, it is critical for the international community to realize that
the crisis is “primarily a refugee crisis” and not simply a migrant crisis because accurate
terminology or language sets the tone for public opinion and government policies towards
the crisis (Malone, 2015; UNHCR, 2015c). Similar to the U.S. government’s advocacy
for calling the Vietnamese living in Thailand as refugees (opposed to victims of war),
governments are more inclined to help people fleeing persecution and war than those
seeking economic improvements. This section provides a brief presentation of the
terminologies and ideas related to refugees and migration used in the following study.
In spite of the challenges of establishing who is and who is not a refugee, the
majority of the world’s countries have adopted the UN’s conception of refugee. The 1951
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees applies the term refugee to anyone
who is unwilling or unable to return to their home countries “owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
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social group or political opinion.”6 Essentially, refugees are people who have crossed
international borders to seek protection based on well-founded fear of persecution in their
countries of nationality or habitual residence.7
The Geneva conception of refugee has two implications for the relationship
between the state and the refugee. First, the presence of refugees indicates the breakdown
of the normal social bond between the sovereign and the citizen (Grahl-Madsen, 19661972; Shacknove, 1985). Secondly, the Geneva Convention acknowledges statesponsored persecution as the only means for the breakdown of the social contract.
According to social contract theory, civil society is a human community united by mutual
trust and responsibility but the sanctity of this contract is violated when those bonds are
broken. The modern state is a political bargain between the sovereign and the citizens.
The state remains a legitimate political power so long as its citizens are loyal to the
sovereign or ruler. To ensure loyalty and obedience, the sovereign must provide citizens
with the basic needs for survival and protect “them from the invasion of foreigners, and
the injuries of one another” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 105). Thus, the conditions for refugeehood
are created when the “normal, positive relation between the citizen and the state” is
ruptured by predatory states that choose to harm, instead of protect, its citizens
(Shacknove, 1985, p. 278).
The UN’s emphasis on persecution by the state overlooks the various other forms
of the negation of civil society. Arguably, the conception of refugee adopted by the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union, remains the most salient
6

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Signed 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April
1954) 189 UNTS 137, art. 1A(2). Also, see the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which
omitted time and geography from the 1951 Convention.
7

“Habitual residence” is included to account for stateless persons.
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alternative to the almost universal one advanced by the United Nations. In the 1969
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the OAU
expanded the UN’s stipulation of persecution based on “well-founded fear” to include the
negation of civil society as a result of external factors:
The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public
order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside of his country of origin or nationality [emphasis added].8
In this manner, the OAU recognizes the disruption and chaos of fragile or weak
states as conditions of persecution that forces people to migrate and seek protection. As
Shacknove (1985) observes, civil societies “periodically disintegrate because of their
fraility [sic] rather than because of their ferocity, victims of domestic division or foreign
intervention” (p. 276). Yet for many of the developed and industrialized states of the
global north, the OAU’s conception of refugee is too inclusive since it captures a “large
and varied universe of oppressed, suppressed, malcontent, and poor persons” from
victims of genocide and ethnic cleansing to victims of natural disasters (Zolberg, Suhrke,
& Aguayo, 1989, p. 4).
In contrast with persecution, governments agree that alienage is a basic
requirement for refugee status. According to Atle Grahl-Madsen (1966-1972), the
seminal authority on refugee law, the refugee is an alien because the condition of
alienage assumes that the individual is outside of his or her country of formal nationality.
Furthermore, an alien is also a person who does not enjoy the rights and obligations
attached to the country of residence (Grahl-Madsen, 1966-1972, p. 92). The concept of
8

Organization of African Unity, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa (Signed 10 September 1969, entered into force 20 June 1974) 1001 UNTS 45 [hereinafter OAU
Refugee Convention], art. 1(2).
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alienage corresponds with the non-intervention clause of the Westphalian sovereignty
doctrine, which prohibits foreign states from interfering, directly or indirectly, in the
internal affairs of another state without its consent.9
Although the theory of non-intervention, a cornerstone of modern statehood,
sustains the state’s territorial integrity and right to self-determination, its practical
application is contentiously debated in terms of humanitarian interventions. In the
conventional sense, humanitarian interventions are generally considered outside of the
principle of non-intervention because all human beings are entitled to the rights and
freedoms proclaimed in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Scholars
have argued that international law legitimates humanitarian intervention since states have
the responsibility to protect not only their citizens from gross human rights violations but
also the global citizenry (Eckert, 2001; Sellers, 2001; Weiss, 2012).
Critics on the opposing end of this debate posit that the use of military forces in
humanitarian relief is a “product [of] or part of a deliberate scheme to overstress
individual human rights at the expense of national sovereignty and political
independence” (Shen, 2001, p. 9; see also Fassin & Pandolfi, 2010). While others argue
that humanitarian peacekeeping projects will not succeed without military support (Hirsh,
2000). Despite this debate in international humanitarian law, international refugee law
upholds the non-intervention principle. Accordingly, valid conditions for refugeehood
necessitate victims of persecution to migrate “beyond the reach of the oppressive home
government” and into international jurisdiction (Shacknove, 1985, p. 282).

9

See Peace of Westphalia, 1648; also, Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (Signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 16, art.
2(4).
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In sum, claiming refugee status is a difficult task. Even with the OAU’s more
inclusive conception of the normal social bond between the state and the citizen, genuine
refugees must meet these basic conditions before asylum claims are found valid: one,
deprived of basic rights and rights;10 two, no protection from home government; and
third, outside of country of nationality or country of habitual residence. Aside from the
legality of who is a refugee, irregular11 asylum seekers face more scrutiny from recipient
governments since they have arrived without proper documentation. This is the case for
the 137,000 refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe in the first
six months of 2015 (UNHCR, 2015c). However, irregular migration does not bar asylum
seekers from refugee status.
Moreover, many people fleeing persecution may not have the option of legal
migration. Thus, the refugee problem is a not an issue of regular versus irregular arrivals,
but rather providing legal passages for genuine refugees as opposed to ordinary migrants
or more specifically, economic migrants. Like political refugees, economic migrants are
aliens too but Grahl-Madsen (1966-1972, p. 76) warns that the word economic refugee
(Wirtschaftsflüchtling) is a misnomer in its present day application.12 Economic migrants
are pulled to another country because of economic opportunism or higher standard of
10

The Geneva Convention only recognizes the absence of physical security (i.e., persecution) as
the basic threat to individuals but within the literature, vital subsistence (economics) and natural disasters
are also included as basic threats to the survival of the citizen. See Grahl-Madsen, 1966-1972; Shacknove,
1985.
11

Within national and international discourse on refugees, asylum, and migration, the use of terms
such as irregular or illegal depends on political partisanship. I have observed that illegal is associated with
migrants/immigrants and widely used in the United States whereas irregular is commonly linked to
dialogues on refugees and asylum since it is callous to conceive refugees as illegals. While this paper
understands both irregular and illegal as persons with unauthorized status, the irregularity of refugees also
points to their migratory process in seeking asylum (i.e., unconventional means to reaching destination
countries). For further discussion, see Morehouse & Blomfield (2011).
12

Incidentally, the term became popularized during the global economic depression of the 1930s
to describe to German Jews seeking international asylum (Loescher, 1993, p. 17).
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living. Refugees, on the other hand, are pushed out of their home states because of
political instability and violence. While the conditions of a valid refugee and an economic
migrant are not mutually exclusive since liberal democracies tend to have stronger
economies than authoritarian dictatorships, economic migrants do not qualify for refugee
status because they can count on home states for assistance or protection when needed
whereas, refugees have severed that normal bond between citizen and state.
The essence of refugeehood, in the end, is a paradox. With the paradigm of
nation-state sovereignty, refugees, in their condition of statelessness, lack the rights and
benefits that come with citizenship or belonging to a political community. While Louise
Holborn (1975) calls them anomalies, Hannah Arendt (1951/2004) sees refugees as the
“scum of the earth.” As both Holborn and Arendt suggest, refugees are individuals living
outside of the nation-state system. Without nationality or political belonging to a
sovereign entity, refugees are essentially right-less persons. According to this statecentric view, the concept of inalienable human rights is an illusion because individuals,
not governments, are the ultimate source of sovereign law. Yet, as Arendt (1951/2004)
argues, as soon as “human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon
minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to
guarantee them” (p. 370). In this manner, national rights or rights associated with
citizenship to a sovereign territory are tied to universal human rights because states have
the sole responsibility to protect citizens. Consequently, people without membership to a
political community, like refugees and stateless persons,13 lose these “supposedly

13

Refugees and stateless persons are not synonymous. According to Grahl-Madsen (1966-1972),
refugees fall into the condition of statelessness because they are not considered nationals or citizens by any
state (p. 77). Thus, refugees and stateless people do not posses a normal bond with home governments but
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inalienable” rights when they are no longer citizens of a sovereign state (Arendt,
1951/2004, p. 372).
By definition, refugees are the wretched of the earth, the undesirables, who feel
“humiliated” if they are saved and “degraded” if they are helped (Arendt, 1943/1994, p.
114). Ironically, compared to other categories of destitute people, refugee status is a
privileged position. Refugees are entitled to various forms of international aid from
financial assistance to asylum and third-country resettlement. The coveted nature of
refugeehood produces its own internal politics within migratory groups, which became
evident over the August 21, 2015, weekend when about 7,000 refugees crossed the border
into Macedonia from Greece (Al Jazeera [AJ], 2015b). As border authorities struggled to
restrain the refugee flow into Macedonia, AJ correspondent Jonah Hull reported that
Syrians remained behind the breaching crowd: “They [Syrians] want to separate
themselves from the other nationalities; the Pakistanis, the Afghans, the Iraqis […] Many
of the others, they say, are economic migrants” (AJ, 2015a). While Syrians deliberately
distance themselves from the mass to signify their genuine refugeehood, other members
of the group “claim to be Syrians as well, because [they know] it is the Syrians who have
the most valid claim to asylum” (AJ, 2015a).
Although in theory, poor economics or weak infrastructure do not qualify as valid
causes for refugee movements but in practice, governments and the media are inclined to
label unwanted refugees as (economic) migrants regardless of underlying circumstances.
In such cases, the label economic migrant is intended as a deterrence policy to reduce the
number of unwanted refugees from claiming asylum. Furthermore, states evade their

stateless people are considered refugees when they have left their country of habitual residence. For
discussion, see Arendt (1955) and Heuer (2007).
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responsibilities towards refugees by “denying their very status as refugees” and
criminalizing them as illegal migrants (Corabatir, 2015). Likewise, the distinction
between an economic migrant and a political refugee also allows host governments to
screen which people to admit depending on their potential “positive economic asset to
[their] new country” (Rees, 1959, p. 30). Beyond deterrence, the characterization
economic migrant functions as a nuance form of border controls that discriminate against
source countries of refugee flows (Bagaric & Morss, 2005).
As more large-scale refugee movements are stigmatized as security threats and
social burdens by the industrialized world, the international community’s collective
responsibility to protect wanes and more genuine refugees are written off as economic
migrants. The refugee problem has grown to become both “dynamic and endemic” since
the 1.5 million Russians displaced from the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and it will remain
an issue for the generations ahead until the global community reflects on the
“consequences of flight to them [refugees] and the effect of refugeedom upon them” to
formulate a solution other than “those [obligations] dictated by common humanity”
(Rees, 1959, pp. 16-18). Therefore, this study follows Elfran Rees’s (1959) conception of
the refugee as anyone forced to leave their homes and cross national borders, whether
artificial or traditional, to seek protection and assistance from another government other
than their own (p. 9). Accordingly, this working definition accounts for those refugees
branded as migrants while adhering to the Geneva Convention’s stipulation of
persecution and alienage.
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Limits and Contributions
For the purpose of this research, none of the countries (U.S., U.K., Canada,
Australia, and France) mentioned above are interesting historical anchors to critique the
current situation in the Mediterranean. All four of these countries have direct connections
to the conflict in Indochina and the post-war human tragedy (perhaps, less for Canada).
Thus, it makes sense (and was expected) for these four countries to have a higher
distribution of Indochinese refugees, especially the Vietnamese boat people. In terms of
Western responses to the Indochinese refugee crisis, the case of Germany (at least, the
Federal Republic) offers an unfettered insight into admissions policies for and public
receptions of refugees from the developing world. In addition, as the European Union’s
leading state and the top destination for asylum seekers to the EU-28,14 Germany
provides an interesting perspective for a comparative study of the refugee question from
the first wave of boat people in the South China Sea to the current one in the
Mediterranean.
As the Mediterranean saga continues to expand, more critics and scholars have
commented on parallel relationships between the Vietnamese boat people and the
contemporary ones, which include the plight of the Rohingya and Bangladeshi boat
people in the Andaman Sea and the Mediterranean crisis (see Betts, 2015; Gil, 2015;
Goodwin-Gill, 2015; Lipsky, 2015; Madokoro, 2015; Neuman, 2015). With references to
the Indochinese refugee crisis, observers have scrutinized the EU’s militarized solution
(“war on trafficking”) as nothing more than a “convenient scapegoat” (Betts, 2015).
Many observers, like the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and McGill Law
14

Eurostat (online data code: tps00191) reported that the EU-28 received an estimated 562,265
new asylum applications in 2014 and 31% of which were lodged in Germany. The United Nations cited a
slightly higher figure for the EU 28 with 570,800 new applicants in 2014; see UNHCR, 2015a.
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Professor François Crépeau, have called for a global relief program similar to the CPA in
1989 (Crépeau, 2015; Madokoro, 2015). In this respect, the CPA is a compelling
reminder to the international community of their coordinated efforts during the
Indochinese boat people crisis, but the socio-political climate during the Indochina crisis
is substantially different from the current world system. Similar to other political
phenomena, refugee problems are best “understood and evaluated only within the general
political, economic and social framework in which they have taken place” (Holborn,
1975, p. xviii).
The refugee movements across the Mediterranean and the Andaman Seas demand
a comprehensive diagnosis but not one identical to the Indochinese crisis, which was
described as “so particular, so specific, and so dramatic” (Robinson, 1998, p. 281). It took
nearly 14 years after the first boat left Vietnam in 1975 for the global public to seek a
comprehensive plan of action. Thus, the Indochinese experience and the CPA are, at best,
historical lessons to improve upon—not direct blueprints for future refugee crises. As
Alan Simmance concluded at the International Seminar on the Indochinese Exodus and
the International Response in 1995, “Two concepts left behind – international burdensharing and temporary asylum – proved a mixed legacy, both capable of being applied
either to great humanitarian advantage or as an easy excuse to shift the responsibility and
avoid the blame” (as cited in Robinson, 1998, p. 281).
Despite the “spirit of international solidarity” in the face of human misery, the
Indochina experience was a turning point for Western liberal democratic states (UNHCR,
2000, pp. 102-103). Before Indochina, refugee crises were regionally localized. Between
1930 and 1950, refugees were moving from one side of Europe to the other, usually from
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East to West. Russian refugees escaping the Bolshevik Revolution made their way to
Western Europe and West Germany welcomed East Germans after the Second World
War. While the period of decolonization (from the mid-1950s) changed the refugee
context from a European issue to “a third-world problem,” the Indochina crisis began a
new era in asylum policies and ushered in a new kind of refugee problem (Casella, 1988,
p. 187). The open shore for an open door policy turned asylum into a conditional clause
dependent on third-country resettlements. The Indochina experience revealed to the
international community a radically different side to the refugee issue. For the first time,
the refugee problem has spilled over “ethno-economic borders” and the “quest for refuge
from an underdeveloped country became tantamount to resettlement in the industrialised
world” (Casella, 1988, p. 187). The fall of Indochina corroded the sanctity of asylum and
marked the breakdown of the equilibrium15 in international burden sharing.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the “era of the homeless man,” Western
governments have become more and more “disenchanted with resettlement” and thus,
states are less willing to commit to open-ended resettlement pledges as they did more
than three decades ago (Kliot, 1987; UNHCR, 2000). By the twentieth century, the
refugee has come to symbolize the political and social condition of the modern world (see
Beyer, 1981; Smyser, 1985; Xenos, 1993). Reflecting “our unsettled time,” W. R. Smyser
(1985) explains that refugees have become “an inevitable and often highly visible byproduct of almost every conflict and every crisis” (p. 157).

15

By equilibrium, I mean the changing nature of the global refugee problem after World War II.
By the 1960s, the poorest countries (in the Middle East and Africa) carried the burden of physical asylum
and liberal democracies of the industrialized world do their part by offering financial support.
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In the UNHCR’s latest Global Trends Report, the end of 2014 saw an estimated
59.5 million people forcibly displaced worldwide (2015b, p. 2). With 8.3 million more
individuals than last year, the 2014 global forced displacement figure ranks the 24th
largest nation in the world. The Syrian crisis, alone, has produced over 4 million refugees
as of July 2015 and the UN expects the figure to top 4.27 million by the end of 2015
(UNHCR, 2015d). This “nation of the displaced” includes 19.5 million refugees,16 38.2
million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 1.8 million asylum seekers. Statistically,
the twenty-first century has replaced the previous century as “the century of the refugee”
(Xenos, 1993, p. 422). In many respects, these figures are also an indication that the
Indochina experience did not produce durable reforms in regards to the international
refugee regime and the collective responsibility of states to protect those fleeing
persecution.
Accordingly, the dilemma behind Europe’s boat people is not the sheer number of
maritime deaths or the staggering increase in migration flows to the EU, but rather how
Member States are reacting to the issue. Germany welcomed its first group of boat
people—Vietnamese from the Hai Hong affair—on December 3, 1978, with open arms
and solidarity (Adelman, 2015; DW, 2003). The premier of Lower Saxony, Ernst
Albrecht, greeted the Vietnamese refugees at the airport in Hanover:
We know what kind of suffering lies behind you, and we feel with you. You have
come to a country where you can live freely, without being oppressed by anyone.
You don’t need to be afraid, but instead can start your new life with courage and
optimism. (As cited in DW, 2003)
Yet the Mediterranean boat people are not greeted in the same manner. The prevailing
dialogues in the EU have capitalized on securing the Fortress Europe and keeping people
16

This figure remains true to the Global Trends 2014 report published on 18 June 2015.
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out instead of honoring international humanitarian protocols, which declares that “Europe
has a clear responsibility to help those seeking protection from war and persecution”
(UNHCR, 2015c). This begs the question of why the Vietnamese boat people were
deemed more deserving of asylum than the Mediterranean ones.
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2. A Refugee Crisis or an Engulfing Avalanche?
In the post-Cold War world, “peace is no longer threatened primarily by
aggressors marching across the borders of sovereign states” but the sanctity of borders,
sovereignty, and notions of modern statehood are increasingly threatened by refugee
flows and mass migration movements from developing states in the global south to
industrialized states in the global north (Loescher, 1993, p. 12). Correspondingly, this
chapter concentrates on the social construction of the refugee as a security threat to the
established state.
Though Catherine Dauvergne (2004) claims that in our present era, the “control
over the movement of people has become the last bastion of sovereignty” (p. 588), but
the opposite is also true. Globalization has, ironically, also made open borders an
inevitable reality, and it is nearly impossible to curb the transnational flow of people
(Casey, 2009, p. 25). Accordingly, the next portion first surveys how migration has
emerged as a security issue and then considers how refugees and the concept of asylum
suffer the consequences when state sovereignty is projected as “absolute power over
territory and people” (Dauvergne 2004, p. 595).
State Security and Mass Migration
Security, or rather insecurity, is at the root of the refugee problem. As mentioned
above, refugeehood arises when there ceases to exist the minimal social bond between the
citizen and the state and without the “protective confines of society,” the individual
reverts back to “a generalized condition of insecurity” (Shacknove, 1985, p. 278; see
Hobbes, 1651). Refugeehood, consequently, is a vulnerable condition because it exposes
the individual to some of the threats to basic human survival such as persecution, famine,
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and natural disasters (Grahl-Madsen, 1966-1972, pp. 75-76; Shacknove, 1985, p. 278).
While the relationship between refugee and security is not a novel concept, the current
discourse has transgressed from understanding refugees as victims of insecurity to
treating refugees as perpetrators of insecurity.
In terms of security studies, the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry marks a new
era in the understanding of security (see Buzan, 1991; Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Campbell,
1992; Ullman, 1995). The rise of the détente period and eventually the fall of the Soviet
Union provided the political space needed to challenge the traditional approach to
security (i.e., the military-state centrism). The post-Cold War literature has expanded the
meaning of security to include non-military security threats (“broadening”). Likewise, the
expansion of security studies also contested the state as the traditional referent object
(“deepening”). Within this context, international migration and the nation emerged as
new facets in the security debate. Coinciding with the shift in security studies, liberal
democratic states in Europe and North America, disenchanted with refugee resettlement
programs in the 1960s and 1970s, began enforcing restrictive asylum policies and tighter
border controls in the 1980s and 1990s (see Huysmans, 2000; Whitaker, 1998).
It follows that the refugee/migrant does not pose as an automatic threat but
instead; the refugee/migrant is “dramatiz[ed] … [and] presented as an existential threat”
in the post-bipolar world (Wæver, 1996, p. 106; cf. Boswell, 2007). According to
securitization theorists,1 security is understood as a specific practice of framing an issue
(Wæver, 1996). Unlike the traditionalists, securitization theorists argue that security is a
self-referential act “because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue”
1

The theory of securitization is the Copenhagen School’s contribution to the scholarship on the
social construction of security. See Buzen, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 1995a; Wæver, Buzan,
Kelstrup, & Lemaitre, 1993.
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(Wæver, 1996, p. 107). In this perspective, security is a form of political communication
or a speech-act where “the word security is not interesting as a sign referring to
something more real (the security thing) – it is the enunciation itself that is the act
[emphasis added]” (Wæver, 1996, p. 107; see Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24; Williams, 2003).
Therefore, the securitization of refugees is “neither a neutral nor an innocent activity”
(Huysmans, 1995, p. 54). During this process, the securitizing actors (e.g., the executive
branch, political elites, the media, specialized agencies, etc.) all have an agenda or
objective for identifying, advancing, and legitimizing the refugee (or the preferred
terminology: migrant) as the source of insecurity on their home states (Goodwin-Gill,
1999; Watson, 2009; Williams, 2003).2
Related to the securitization of refugees/migrants, the nation or society, rather
than the state, is presented as the existentially threatened object. For this reason, Wæver
et al. (1993) posit that societal (in)security has replaced the conventional concept of state
sovereignty in the security discourse. The concept of societal security isolates the nation
or society as a reference object independent of the state (Huysmans, 1995; Wæver, 1996;
Wæver et al, 1993). Moreover, societal security underlines the importance of identity3 in
the securitization process by presuming that the Self is threatened by the Other (Buzan et
al., 1998, pp. 119-123; see Campbell, 1992). In the same way that state security means
maintaining its sovereignty, Wæver (1996) explains: “To a society, survival [security]
spells identity [because when] a society is no longer itself, it has not survived” (pp. 1082

I present a more thorough analysis of this process later in the chapter.

3

Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 119-120) assert that societal security is best understood as “identity
security” since it is about self-sustaining identity groups and the preservation of their traditions, culture,
and language. Furthermore, associated societal security as identity security helps to distinguish it from
political security, which pertains to the “organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the
ideologies that give them legitimacy” (Buzan, 1991, p. 433). See also, Buzan et al., 1998, chap. 7.
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109). In Wæver’s more critical analysis of security, identity functions to distinguish the
in-group from the out-group with both groups depicted as monolithic. This qualifies the
host nation (of destination countries) as the in-group while refugees/migrants are seen as
the out-group.
Although securitization theory runs the risk of essentializing identity groups (see
McSweeney, 1996), it does capture the xenophobic and racist sentiments associated with
the refugee movements in the post-Cold War era since the refugee-producing countries
are generally located in Asia and Africa while most of the destination countries are
industrialized states in the West. Thus the societal security approach assumes that “they”
– the refugees/migrants, foreigners, who do not share “our” history, culture, and language
– are security threats to the survival of “our” nation. As Huysmans (1995) puts it, once
refugees and migrants are securitized (i.e., dramatized as a security issue), they become
cultural Others who have disrupted “a harmonious world” simply by entering “a politicalterritorial area where they are considered not to belong” (p. 59). Logically, government
leaders and political elites will craft policies in defense of national security4 following the
securitization of refugees and migrants on asylum, borders, and migration.
The fact that securitization of refugees/migrants, or international migration in
general, manifested around the same time as the shift in the source countries of refugee
flows raises questions about how race plays a factor in the asylum crisis. The
securitization of migration discourse is contingent on the fear that cultural differences
will upset the social fabric. Unlike the old form of racism based on biology or race, this
“new racism” or “post-modern racism” locates the source of inferiority in cultural
4

The Copenhagen School stresses that national security and state security are two separate
concepts. While the former is understood as the survival of the society, the people, or the nation, the latter
refers to the survival of the state. See Wæver (1996).
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identity and values (see Barker, 1981; Gale, 2004; Ibrahim, 2005). The new racism
discourse juxtaposes the cultural identity of refugees and migrants with that of host
nation, which reifies the refugee/migrant as cultural aliens threatening the national
identity (understood as a form of life) of host countries (see Gale, 2004, p. 323;
Huysmans, 1995, p. 56; 2000, p. 753).
Although the securitization of migration is widely based on the cultural identity
axis, Scott Watson (2009) argues that the culture/identity angle does not tell the complete
picture. While it is explicit that Watson developed his thesis from Wæver and Buzan’s
theory of securitization, he holds state security (rather than the security of the nation) as
strategic in the securitization of migration discourse. In maintaining that state sovereignty
is fundamental to the securitized refugee/migrant story, Watson (2009) clarifies that
social breakdown results from the state’s inability to control its borders. Watson (2009)
argues that cultural pluralism is merely a side effect (albeit an important one) but the
ultimate cause for the securitization of migration is uncontrolled population movements
across national borders. Contrary to Wæver et al.’s (1993) societal (in)security theory,
multiculturalism can benefit society as evidence by the guest worker programs in places
like West Germany and France where a significant number of non-Europeans were
admitted to fuel the labor shortage in Europe after the Second World War. Moreover,
Europe’s desperation for cheap laborers meant that states willingly admit “Third World
migrants … as immigrants [even] if they were rejected as refugees” (Loescher, 1993, p.
81).
In line with Dauvergne’s (2004) assertion that globalization has transformed
migration law into the last stronghold of state sovereignty (p. 588), Watson (2009) posits
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that the ability to control access to the state is at the forefront of the securitization of
migration discourse (pp. 6-7). While the abstract refugee stands outside the nation state
paradigm, Nevzat Soguk (1999) contends that the underlying purpose of the international
refugee regime, since its inception in 1951, is to “restore her [refugee] to the natural
political condition through repatriation or resettlement” (as cited in Watson, 2009, p. 35).
In advancing the rehabilitative nature of the modern conception of refugees (i.e.,
“normalizing” the social bond between citizens and states), Watson argues for the
continued resilience and relevance of the state as a crucial actor in the securitizing
discourse against the forces of globalization and nationalism (see Dauvergne, 2004;
Wæver, 1996, pp. 10-11).
That said, the emergence of national identity as a form of security emphasizes the
concomitant relationship between the survival of the state and the survival of the nation
in regards to mass migration.5 In terms of the politics of national identity, constructing
and maintaining sovereign statehood extends beyond attaining territoriality and
impenetrability. Sovereignty requires legitimacy from a people and insofar as the nation
is an imagined political community, securing sovereignty depends on the state’s ability to
cultivate and maintain the identity (understood as security) of the nation. Therefore, the
securitized refugee/migrant poses a risk to the security/survival of the nation as well as
the state.
Border controls and migration laws are important elements for securing state
sovereignty and national identity because it demarcates a “clear bright line” between
nationals and non-nationals, between citizens and aliens, and deifies the border for those
5

This shows a clear deviation from Wæver’s (1996, p. 112) claims: “It is the struggle between
different programmes for the [survival of the] nation that are decisive, not the sovereignty conservatism of
the states.”
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trying to cross it and those preventing it (Dauvergne, 2004, pp. 590-91). Even in the
classical understanding of sovereignty as territoriality, Dauvergne (2004) argues that
states preserve their territory by regulating the movement of people (p. 594). As long as
the state reserves its absolute power to implement laws and policies on migration, refugee
admissions, and border controls, it survives as a sovereign entity and the nation is secured
in consequence. Supporting this notion of state sovereignty, the next section considers
how government and political elites securitized migration to show how migrants
jeopardize the state’s territorial supremacy and the society’s national identity. That is,
states declare their power and capacity as sovereign states through “othering” and
controlling who gets to enter their territories, which also ensures the survival of their
national identities or as Dauvergne (2004) calls it, their nationness.
The Securitization of Migration
The Copenhagen School prefers the term securitization to security because
security is a deliberate act aimed to elevate an issue beyond its normative understanding
and frames it either as “a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al., 1998,
p. 23 [emphasis added]). In this manner, securitization is conceptualized as the highest
form of politicization where an issue is depicted and accepted as an existential threat
requiring immediate measures “outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan
et al., 1998, p. 24).6 The securitization method is radical in its ability to intersubjectively
transform a public issue or debate into the referent object of security with ample saliency
to generate policies outside the routine of normal politics (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 25-26).
6

Buzan et al. (1998) argues that all public policies are within a continuum that ranges from the
nonpoliticized (where issues are not subjects of public debate and the state does not deal with them) to the
politicized (where issues are part of public policy that requires government decision and resources) to the
top level of securitized (where issues are seen as imminent risks eliciting immediate actions above normal
politics (pp. 23-24).
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Accordingly, effective securitization first involves a successful securitizing move
followed by the adaption (or at least the legitimation) of emergency measures beyond the
established political rules.7
Securitizing Moves and Securitized Outcomes
The ultimate goal of the securitizing move is the audience’s acceptance of a
political issue as a security issue. As such, the securitizing move is a discursive process in
which the securitizing actor presents an issue as an existential threat to a specific referent
object. Since security is about survival (Wæver, 1996), the existential quality of an issue
or threat is imperative because only when the referent object (i.e., the endangered thing)
fears for its existence will the securitizing actor have the legitimacy to enact measures
and policies outside the norms of established politics. Furthermore, the securitizing move
as a discourse reiterates the Copenhagen School’s communicative action approach of
security as a speech-act (see Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995a; Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup,
& Lemaitre, 1993). This establishes security as a performance, a social construction, in
which the very act of identifying something as “security” dramatizes it as an existential
threat and necessitates defense or security for the threatened object.
As a speech-act, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) understand security as
intersubjective practice between the securitizing actor and the functioning actors—that is,
the intended audience (pp. 30 & 36). Contra to security approaches where threats are
defined as objectively real or subjectively perceived, to study security intersubjectively

7

Technically, Buzan et al. (1998) claim that there are three components to a successful
securitization, “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of
rules” (p. 26), but these three steps are accounted for within my two-step modification since identifying
existential threats is the first step to the securitizing move and the presence of emergency actions presumes
a “rejection of the normal operating rules that govern the relationship between the two units” (Watson,
2009, p. 26).
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means that the act of securitizing is a negotiation between the securitizer (i.e., the
speaker) and the audience (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). Therefore, a securitizing move is
less concerned with the physical reality of a threat (e.g., military invasion) and more
concerned with the use of discourse and language to lift an issue beyond the political
sphere and prioritize it as a security interest. The task of securitizing is to construct a
“shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a
threat” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26).
It is worthy to note that the success of a securitizing move (and subsequently,
securitization) does not rest solely on the speaker’s ability to coerce8 the audience into
accepting the security discourse (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). Since securitization is a
negotiated speech-act, the securitizing actors, usually governing elites, political leaders
and other institutions with high social capital, must persuasively argue and convince the
relevant audience of their security claim. As such, securitization succeeds when members
of the targeted audience have accepted the speech-act as valid. Therefore, Buzan et al.
(1998) argue that, “security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects
[i.e., existential threats] nor with the subjects [i.e., the audience] but among the subjects,”
which means the acceptance is a collective conclusion made within the audience (p. 31;
cf. Balzacq, 2005).
This implies that securitization takes place in the public sphere for securitizing
actors need to justify and rationalize their claims for calling this particular issue or

8

Although, Buzan et al. (1998) does highlight that a certain degree of coercion is unavoidable
even in democratic societies: “Accept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it
only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as consent” (p. 25). Due to the nature of policymaking in democracies, security issues are presented in the public sphere first before they become
“institutionalized as a package legitimization, and … thus possible to have black security boxes in the
political process” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 28).
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circumstance a special type of politics or above politics. Although this need for a public
discourse is closely associated with liberal-democratic societies, the rhetorical structure
of securitization functions the same way in non-democratic societies since all societies
are governed by certain rules and the aim of securitizing is to move an issue outside the
limits of those rules (see Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24; Vuori, 2008, pp. 66 & 72). In
securitizing an issue, political elites intensify its urgency and show that “it should not be
exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top
leaders” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29).
Additionally, Buzan et al. (1998) describe three “facilitating conditions” or factors
that stage the appropriate setting under which the speech-act occurs as intended and
convince the audience of the security claim (p. 32). The first condition requires the
securitizer to craft the speech-act (the securitizing claim) within the logic or grammar
security. Under the category of “internal, linguistic-grammatical,” this condition is the
most important because it leans credibility to the securitizing claim insofar as the
audience can locate which sector is under threat with a “plot that includes existential
threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 33). The second
condition stipulates that securitizing actors hold positions of authority and in return,
audiences are more likely to accept securitizing claims. Buzan et al. (1998) clarify that
positions of authority refers to the speaker’s social capital and not official authority in the
political system, which widens the scope of who/what can perform the securitizing act.
The last condition involves the alleged threats themselves insofar as their associated
features could either expedite or encumber securitization: “It is more likely that one can
conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally held to be
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threatening—be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters” (Buzan et al., 1998, p.
33).
Although these facilitating conditions are necessary for securitization, it does not
equate successful securitization in the end. As the name suggests, facilitating conditions
are basic requirements for the speaker to market, persuade, and argue alleged threats to a
select audience. In the case that securitizing moves failed, that is, the audience rejects (or
ignores) the securitizing claims, this suggests that securitizing actors did not meet all
three facilitating conditions. However, when the audience does accept a securitizing
move that should not suggest successful securitization for acceptance is but one part of
the equation. To consider securitization as successful, acceptance should lead to the
identification of a potential plan of action and/or implementation of emergency measures
(Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 24-25; Watson, 2009, p. 26).
In light of this component, securitized outcomes do not strictly mean adopting
immediate action but rather, that the existential threat was argued in a way where it
becomes salient enough to legitimize emergency measures that would otherwise be
impossible under routine politics (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). Basically, a securitized issue
is one that has advanced beyond politicization and into the point of no return where the
survival of the referent object depends on breaking the established political norms. This
sense of urgency is fundamentally a political tool to drive seemingly nonpoliticized topics
to the realm of security, which traditionally is privileged above all else in politics.
However, if securitization in the end does not require actual implementation of
emergency measures, then it reduces the likelihood that there was an existential threat to
the referent object in the first place. Accordingly, the process of securitizing an issue
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underscores that one must take immediate action to address the problem before it is too
late (see Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995b & 1996). For this reason, Watson (2009) is
accurate in asserting that the securitization succeeds when securitizing actors can enforce
emergency measures without having to continually justify their actions (p. 27). Now
whether or not the actions adopted are effective in resolving the situations is besides the
point of securitization because the crux of securitization is that it violates prevailing
political standards within and between securitizing actors, referent objects, and functional
actors (i.e., the audience).
Conclusions
National governments have constructed refugees as threats by way of burdening
the economies of host countries (e.g., Italy and Greece as first ports of entry for majority
of the Mediterranean refugees to Europe) or disintegrating the cultural and ethnic makeup
of receiving societies (e.g., Syrian refugee population upsetting the balance of ethnic
groups in Turkey’s southern provinces). Moreover, the line between politically
persecuted refugee groups and political marginalized separatist groups is often hard to
locate. Ethnic conflicts and revolutionary armed struggles in much of the developing
regions involve “politically and militarily active refugee groups” (Loescher, 1993, p. 14).
Zolberg et al. (1989) coined the term “refugee-warrior communities” to describe
refugee groups that are “not merely a passive group of dependent refugees but represent
highly conscious refugee communities” with leadership and armed fractions seeking
political objectives (p. 275). The concept of refugee warriors can apply to the 3 million
Afghan refugees in the 1980s that formed the base of the Afghan mujaheddin9 in Pakistan
to challenge the Soviet-backed government in Kabul or the Khmer guerrilla bases that
9

Arabic term referring to Muslim guerrilla fighters.
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integrated with refugee camps on the Thai-Kampuchean (Cambodian) border during the
Indochina crises (see Loescher, 1993, pp. 13-16; Zolberg et al., 1989, pp. 275-278).
Conclusively, there are compelling reasons for the securitization of refugees elsewhere
but in Germany with its Holocaust memories, securitizing the refugee is easier said than
done.
Under these circumstances, the securitization of refugees and refugee flows by
government leaders and socio-political elites in Germany is cloaked under the
securitization of migrants and migration movements. From a nation-state perspective,
refugees and migrants are not that different for both groups are foreigners in a new land,
which makes it difficult to distinguish between migrant controls and refugee protection.
Dauvergne (2004) summarizes this phenomenon like so:
[R]efugees and illegal migrants occupy much of the same space in our collective
imagination. They are envisioned as have nots, hoping to gain from our
beneficence. They are foreign, other, desperate, brown-skinned. They are not us.
Thus the current crack down on illegal migration cracks down on refugees as
well. (p. 601)
In this manner, refugees and asylum become features of illegal
migrants/migration that aids in the securitization of both refugees and migrants (see
Buzan et al., 1998; Huysmans, 2000). Equally so, the securitization of migration has led
to a connotation bias in the label illegal. Illegal does not invoke images of “British
backpackers overstaying Australia’s Gold Coast” but rather, illegals are imaged as “poor
and brown and destitute” (Dauvergne, 2004, p. 599). This imagery of the illegal prestructures the Germany’s discourse on asylum and refugees, making asylum, border
controls, and immigration policies nearly indistinguishable for the receiving audience.
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The securitization of migration is the securitization of asylum. It securitizes and
criminalizes those searching for a better life and those searching for a safer one. States
discredit (or frame) asylum seekers as bogus refugees or economic migrants so that they
fit the securitized narrative of migration as destabilizing element to the welfare of the
state as well as the nation’s cultural homogeneity. However, securitization is a choice
made by securitizing and functional actors, whether it is political elites deliberately
choosing to securitize migration and asylum and/or the receiving audience’s choosing to
accept the securitized issue. In any case, refugee crises are not necessarily issues of
national security but are constructed that way by governments.
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3. Destination Germany: Refugees, Migrants and the Nation
This chapter is devoted to investigating the Germany’s handling of the current
Mediterranean refugee crisis. Far from an unprecedented1 event, the refugee crisis in the
Mediterranean has reached a point of no return as a result of Europe’s negligence of its
humanitarian responsibilities and the securitization of migration. In this manner, the shift
in German policies toward refugees exposes how the state manipulates asylum and
refugee protection policies to fit their national security agendas.
Despite international law and formalized expectations of states’ humanitarian
responsibilities, the case of Germany reveals how state policies on asylum and refugees
reflect the interconnection between the state, national identity, and the Other. In other
words, asylum and refugee policies reflect the state’s narratives2 of the Other group as
they relate to the nation’s founding myths. Variances in policies or treatments of the
Other result from this process of representation in which foreign groups are narrated as
either positive or negative contributors to the collective identity of national states
according to time and political space. In this relationship, the Vietnamese and
Mediterranean refugees and migrants, as the Other groups, are objects of Germany’s
construction of a national history that justifies the present Self and ensures a national
future.

1

See European Commission, Joint Communication Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The
Role of the EU External Action, JOIN(2015) 40 Final, 09 September 2015.
2

The term narrative used here refers to its functionality in linguistic theory. More than simple
stories about the past, narratives are “international, transhistorical, [and] transcultural” models that
summarize or reduce human experiences without damaging the “individuality of the message” (Barthes,
1966/1975, pp. 237 & 269). This indicates that narratives translate the meaning of specific experiences in a
form that others can understand without losing the original character. For further discussion, see White
(1980).
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section briefly
explains the historical maturity of German state formation and nation building processes
in order to stress the significance of the present re-unified German nation and its
continuity. The next two sections introduce the Other, Vietnamese and Mediterranean
refugees, into Germany’s formation and maintenance of the national state. I exclusively
focuses on West Germany’s admittance of the South Vietnamese boat people in the late
1970s and early 1980s since East Germany’s Vietnamese population were contract
workers imported by the GDR to sustain its economic growth, which indicates that the
Vietnamese Other in East Germany are migrants rather than refugees.
Opposite of the Vietnamese group, the Mediterranean refugees are perceived as
potential threats to the maintenance of the re-unified German national identity. I argue
that Germany’s uneasiness with the Mediterranean refugee group suggests that the reunified German nation is not as sturdy as the German state envisions to the international
community. Indicating the enduring legacy of the Berlin Wall in German society, policy
debates and public discourses over the situation of the Mediterranean refugees have the
potential to create the space needed for the revival of Cold War East-West national
disunity and antagonisms. Ultimately, Germany’s treatment of the Mediterranean
refugees reveals their insecurity of a fragmented re-unified German national identity.
The German Volk
I argue the variation in state policies toward refugees and migrants depends on
how the socially constructed Other group influence the identity of the host nation.
Therefore, the critical variable in this relationship is the national identity of destination
countries because the survival of the We-identity (i.e., the host nation) is “always a
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question of the construction of something as threatening some ‘we’” (Buzan et al., 1998,
p. 120). This is especially true for the German nation since its national history is filled
with discontinuities and interruptions unlike France or Britain’s linear development of
their nation-state. Having endured two periods of unification (1870-1871 and 19891991), the present German state has existed for roughly 25 years and thus, the continual
production and reproduction of “us” is strategic to the country’s leadership position
within the European Union. Accordingly, the following outlines the unique development
of the German nation and national identity.
Unlike the Western state ideal-type, German consciousness resulted from
Napoleon’s invasion in the early nineteenth century and developed as an anti-French
philosophy. German nationalism began as a rejection of France’s civic model of
nationalism with leading scholars, such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Ernst Moritz Arndt,
and Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, emphasizing Germany’s historical and cultural uniqueness.
Greenfeld (2001) calls German nationalism as the “Western ‘Eastern’” paradigm because
of its combination of romanticism’s ethnic and collectivistic characteristics and French
Revolutionary nationalist fervor. Hans Kohn (1949) argues that German nationalism is
similar to non-Western movements because Germany’s national awakening emerged to
safeguard the rights of the nation against foreign occupation rather than the rights of
individuals against the tyranny of government.
French nationalism – alike in this to Anglo-American nationalism – was born in
the enthusiasm of a revolution, in an attempt to reform the state and to build a
better society … [but] German nationalism … was born in the war against France,
not in an attempt to secure better government, individual liberty, and due process
of law but in an effort to drive out a foreign ruler and to secure national
independence. (Kohn, 1949, p. 789)
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Accordingly, Greenfeld (2001) labels German national identity as collectivisticethnic. The German nation is understood as a collective individual based on ethnic
relations (i.e., common descent, shared language, etc.). Ethnic nationalism argues that
nationality or membership to a nation is organic and primordial. Aside from cultural and
primordial elements, Germany’s version of ethnic nationalism is strongly associated with
economic development. Bert Hoselitz (1956) remarks that the relationship between
economic conditions within newly independent societies and national sentiments among
the members indicates that state leaders identify “the ideology of nationalism … [as] one
of the requirements for the achievement of developmental goals in societies on a
relatively low level of economic advancement” (p. 1). Robert Berdahl (1972) summarizes
the correlation between economic development and nationalism as a people’s realization
of their country’s “economic backwardness,” which propels their “desire for a modern
economy” (p. 72).
In the German case, Friedrich List (1841/1856) was first to link Germany’s
economic backwardness with the lack of national unity in his magnum opus The National
System of Political Economy (see Berdahl, 1972; Gerschenkron, 1962; Levi-Faur, 1997).
While List (1841/1856) alleges that a nation’s power and its level of civilization depend
on the advancement of its economy, he also holds the reciprocal association as true: “the
more advanced their economy, the more civilized and powerful will be the nation, the
more rapidly will its civilization and power increase, and the more will its economical
culture be developed” (p. 72). Accordingly, List rejects Adam Smith’s wealth of nations
principle because cosmopolitan economic policies of free trade, competition, and global
commerce benefit more advanced countries, such as England, at the expense of countries
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that are lower on List’s hierarchy of economical development like Germany. Conversely,
the English’s push for the universal adoption of the free exchange of goods works to
suppress German economic development from advancing beyond a “merely agricultural
country” that “furnish[es] this English world [with] toys for children, wooden clocks,
philological writings,” which degrades the German nation to the same level as English
colonies in Asia and Africa (List, 1841/1856, pp. 72, 207 & 185-86; see Berdahl, 1972).
Additionally, List (1841/1856) argues for a preservation of history, locality, and
national experiences. Instead of Smith’s cosmopolitan economic doctrine that sees the
wealth of nations as entirely contingent on individual efforts and indifferent to the social
and political conditions of the society, List proposes the theory of a national system of
political economy (p. 151). Whereas, Smith’s cosmopolitical economy assumes a
“system based upon a hypothesis that all nations of the world form but one society,”
List’s political (or national) economy underscores the idea of nationality and thus, allows
a given nation in its own “actual condition of the world … [with] its special
circumstances” can “preserve and improve its economic condition” (p. 194).
In this sense, List supports the proposition that German nationalism, while
attached to economic development, is ethnic in its core definition. Moreover, he asserts
that Germany follows a different path to civilization, which includes economic
development as well as political and societal advancement. As such, he understands
national productive powers as both capital-generating sources (e.g., the capacity of
individuals and industries to increase the material wealth of a nation) as well as nonmaterial sources such as national independence (List, 1841/1856, chap. X). Therefore,
List concludes that the basis for German nationality and its regeneration is founded in the
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German’s “primitive character … [of] moral and intellectual culture,” which features
their “taste for labor, order, economy, and moderation […] their sincere desire for
whatever was good, their great natural fund of morality, caution, and thoughtfulness” (p.
152).
While List (1841/1856) calls the “actual civilization” of Germans theoretical in
reference to German society’s “infatuation for systems of philosophy” and ideologies (pp.
152-53), Germany’s nation-state building process is also characteristic of a postindependence state given both countries’ late entrance to modernization (see Hoselitz,
1956). Subsequently, a politically unified Germany demands a strong economy in order
for the German nation to realize its full productive capacities. Moreover, List
(1841/1856) re-affirms the political and economic power of the state is defined by
national unity (p. 281).
As such, the German economy rapidly expanded soon after the defeat of the
French in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) and consequently, the victory contributed
to the establishment of a unified German Empire in 1871. Geopolitically, a thriving
German economy and Prussian military prowess upset the balance of power in Europe for
the rise of a unified and industrialized Germany is a threat to France and Britain as
Western Europe’s economic and political center. Within a relatively short time span,
Germany did not simply catch up to Britain and France economically but surpassed them
(Table 2). The rise of Germany as an economic powerhouse helped to transition it from
Europe’s semi-periphery to a “developed center of the European core” (Spohn, 1995, p.
90).
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Table 2: Industrialization in Britain, France, and Germany for Selected Years

Britain
France
Germany

Spread of Railways
(kilometers)
1840
1860
1880
2,390 14,603 25,060
496
9,167 23,089
469
11,089 33,838

1900
30,079
38,109
51,678

Distribution of Global Manufacturing
Production (% of total)
1870
1913
31.8
14.0
10.3
6.4
13.2
15.7

Source: Fontana Economic History of Europe (1973) & League of Nations, Industrialization and World Trade (1945). Adapted
from Halsall (1997).

In regards to German national history, the post-WWII German nation-state
embodies less of that original purity and cultural superiority as romanticized by early
nationalists, which was explicit in terms of the sovereign identity of the German state.
The previously unified German state of 1871 was split and militarily occupied by
foreigners after the German capitulation of Berlin on May 1945. Subsequently, Britain,
France, and the United States led West Germany’s post-war economic and political
reconstruction and the Soviet Union on the East. The East-West divide of Germany
resulted in two opposing paths to reconstruction or rather, continued modernization of
Germany.
The two Germanys modernized at unequal rates with the Allied-occupied side
healthier than the Soviet-occupied side, which also highlighted crucial differences in the
East-West conceptualization of the German national identity. The Iron Curtain became
the defining force in the two Germanys’ construction of its post-Hitler national identity.
In addition to the East-West ideological war, the influx of immigrants to Germany,
particularly people from outside the European continent, help rehabilitate the contrasting
national identities of a divided Germany. Paradoxically, what was equated as positive
(im)migration during the Cold War became the basis of the Ausländerproblem (foreigner
problem) in the years following re-unification.
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Foreigners had a strategic and symbolic role in the reconstruction of Cold War
Germanys. For East and West Germanys, reconstruction fundamentally portends to
economic revitalization. Hence, immigrants, regardless of their distinction as migrants or
refugees, helped fulfill the need for human laborers since the majority of the German
population were either dead, displaced, or had left Germany as a result of World War II.
This demographic deficit along with extremely low birth rates by the end of War
necessitated the need for workers to rebuild the German economies (see Kendzia &
Zimmermann, 2012). The labor shortage worsened in the 1960s with the resurrection of
the Berlin Wall and thus, the Gastarbeiterprogramm (guest worker program) was
initiated to recruit foreign workers, most of who were from Turkey.3
As the name indicates, foreign workers are guests in German society contracted to
work and are expected to leave once that relationship is over. The non-German workforce
consists of people on rotation (rather than permanent stay) who do not “normally draw on
social services or […] need to be integrated into society in terms of housing, pensions,
schools, family provisions, leisure pursuits or cultural background” (Kolinsky, 1996, p.
80). Regardless of their temporary stay, contract workers, mostly from neighboring
Soviet Bloc countries, play a significant role in the GDR’s national identity formation as
socialist state.
Economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic, on the other hand, boosted by
American dollars and European integration (e.g., Marshall Plan, NATO, European
Economic Community, etc.) experienced a Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) in the
1950s, which de-emphasized the role of guest workers in West Germany’s post-war

3

The term Gastarbeiter (guest workers) denotes foreign workers in West Germany and the East
German term is Vertragsarbeiter (contract workers).
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nation building. As a result of successful capitalist industrialization and democratization,
the Federal Republic re-invented itself securely under the umbrella of Western
civilization. Having established the East-West ideological divide and the presence of
foreigners in German society, the next section focuses on the Vietnamese refugees in
West Germany to show the construction of German national identity during the Cold
War. The Federal Republic’s generous response to the (South) Vietnamese refugees
showcases its westward identification (or Europeanness) via international
humanitarianism and asylum.
The Vietnamese Other: West Germany’s Model Minority4
Not unlike the situation of Germany at the end of WWII, Vietnam was divided
into two states, a socialist North and a republic South, at the end of the First Indochina
War in 1954 until its re-unification following the Second Indochina War in 1976. Given
the nature of the partition and re-unification of Vietnam, it is fitting that the West German
government promised asylum for 40,000 refugees fleeing socialist reforms in 1978 (Bui,
2003, p. 16). Not only is asylum an honorable act that is associated with Western
rhetoric, offering protection to those in need is also a privileged act because even the
most politically and economically stable government can only do so much and for so long
to accommodate refugee movements without suffering some costs. At times however,
refugee crises are a source for national unity. Akin to the idea that wars bring a nation
closer, humanitarian crises create an opportunity for nation-states to exert their vitality

4

The juxtaposed images of the Vietnamese as the model minority in West Germany or the
cigarette smugger in East Germany were popularized in 1990s after re-unification, which infers that
western Germans played a larger role in perpetuating them. For example, media outlets and state
institutions’ usage of the cigarette smuggler not only stigmatizes Vietnamese living on the eastern side as
illegal residents and socialist criminals but consequently, establishes eastern Germany as a lawless hotbed
for criminal activity.
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and power on the international sphere in their reactions and leadership to resolving the
problem. Moreover, state leaders have usurped refugee admissions policies to push
certain political agendas.
For example, Western Europe during the Cold War welcomed (and even
encouraged) emigrants from the Soviet Bloc as political refugees regardless of the
validity of their claims as they have “voted with their feet” and each defection becomes a
“ballot for freedom” (Loescher, 1993, chap. 3). By recognizing East Europeans as
genuine refugees, the political power of communism is weakened and refugee-producing
countries, i.e., the Soviet Union and its allies, are defamed as “willful violators of the
human rights of their citizens” (Loescher, 1993, p. 59). Given the nature of the cold war
as an East-West ideological battle, refugees were seen as political opportunities rather
than a problem for Western Europe.
For West Germany, the Indochinese trauma is the social and political backdrop
that enabled the social construction of a new German identity. The presence of the boat
people themselves and their narratives of suffering are condensed into and internalized as
part of the German historical past, which in turn, transformed the post-war West German
nation from Nazism’ inhumanity to the renewed one with sincere human rights
commitments. Peter Krüger (1999) suggests that West Germany’s creation of an open
society fixed on pluralism, liberty, and representative democracy demonstrates its shift
from traditional German ethno-cultural nationalism to a more civic definition. From this
perspective, the Vietnamese Other is an integral part of West Germany’s reconstruction
of a national identity founded on economic prosperity and democratic values.
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This was accomplished in two ways. First, in order to posit West Germany with
the prestige and capacity on par with civilized states, the Vietnamese boat people were
propagated as a poor, desperate group and Germans who came to their rescue were
celebrated as heroes, a people of high moral and political faculties. Secondly, situating
West Germany within Western traditions of liberal democracy necessitate reconciliation
with the Nazi past. This became possible with the integration of refugees into German
society and the creation of a discursive reality based on shared histories of persecution
and victimhood.
Germany’s First Boat People
Although it is a simplistic evaluation, West Germany’s positive representation of
the Vietnamese group is evident in the number of refugees living in the Federal Republic.
Chart 1 (below) compares the estimated stock of refugee in West Germany, France, and
the UK for the years from 1960 to 1985 with data collected by the United Nations. The
sharp increase in West Germany’s refugee population between 1980 and 1985 (24%)
attests to its commitment to the refugee crisis in Indochina as well as the health of the
German state.
In comparison to more established states like France and Britain, West Germany’s
higher refugee percentages is indicative of its successful economic reconstruction during
the post-war years. The economic miracle of the 1950s not only increased the
international prestige of the state, it also helped the nation rebuild its the self-confidence.
The editors of Ten Years of Southeast-Asian Refugees in the Münster Diocese (10
Jahre),5 a pamphlet printed in 1989 in celebration the tenth year anniversary of the arrival

5

10 Jahre is a collection of essays written by Vietnamese authors and distributed by the Club of
Vietnam-Refugees in Münster, which indicates potential biases in its depictions of Vietnamese refugees.
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of the first Vietnamese boat people in Münster, recall the city officials’ spontaneous and
enthusiastic generosity to shelter more Vietnamese than the official federal quota (Bui,
2003, p. 101). Evident by the town of Münster, the editors claim that the “outpouring of
sympathy, personal dedication and money for Vietnamese people in need remained a
decade later … a unique event in German history” (Bui, 2003, p. 101).
West Germany

United Kingdom

France

350,000
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Chart 1: Estimated Refugee Population, 1960-1985
Source: UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). Trends in International Migration Stock:
2008 Revision (UN Database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev. 2008).

For West Germany to project a positive national identity, one divorced from the
memories of Hitler and the Third Reich, the Vietnamese boat refugees are positioned as
helpless strangers in relation to the powerful German nation. Hence, West Germany’s
renewed identity is reproduced and sustained in part by civil society’s goodwill toward
the boat refugees and a general enthusiasm to help the Vietnamese. For example, the
relief organization Cap Anamur Committee is still remembered for their rescue efforts
that were extremely effective in perpetuating “a legendary aura” of refugees’ journey to
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Germany in the early mid-1980s and encouraged more support for the refugee cause (Bui,
2003, p. 90).
In 1980, the rescue group broadcasted a photograph of two Vietnamese children
going through airport security in Germany. According to Bui (2003), the photograph
focuses the public’s attention to the “needy children [and how] they are no longer on a
ramshackle boat [but rather] on the threshold to Germany” (pp. 104-105). Along with
many others, this image helped embed the Federal Republic into the Western culture of
Christian Samaritanism and universal human rights, an accomplishment that indicates
German increased sovereign power and legitimacy. Put simply, Vietnamese refugee boats
and German rescue ships capture the nature of the relationship between the two groups.
Although the relationship was certainly asymmetrical, it succeeded in depicting a
venerable (West) German national state exercising its capacity by providing asylum to
other nationals fleeing persecution and oppression.
Through West Germany’s capacity to provide asylum, it enhanced the state’s
legitimacy among the international community of states, particular the Allied states.
Conversely, asylum presented West Germany the opportunity to redeem itself from
Hitler’s crimes against humanity. Renewed trust in the German nation-state helped to
mitigate lingering reservations about the possibility for Nazi sympathizers to assume high
positions of power in post-war Germany—thus, ensuring the endurance of Allied
democratization (see Merritt, 1976; Tauber, 1967, chap. 2). With regards to the German
people, the boat people narrative became a creative political space to discuss the
possibility of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or overcoming the Nazi past.

52

As follows, the boat people narrative allows West Germans to regain their moral
integrity through the commendable institution of asylum. West Germany’s
humanitarianism toward the Vietnamese refugees reflects its decision to identify with
Western Europe’s liberal democratic political history, which redeems the German nation
as well as the state. As a clarification, this act is West Germany’s struggle to overcome
Nazism and not an outright dismissal of the German national heritage. 10 Jahre
compared the flight and plight of the Vietnamese refugees with the situation of the
Aussiedler, post-war ethnic German refugees expelled from former territories in Germany
and Eastern Europe. In this analogy, the West German nation was constructed as victims
of authoritarian government, much like the Vietnamese people: “We know what
neediness means, and want first of all to at least give the refugees a roof over their head”
(Münster city council, as cited in Bui, 2003, p. 104). Accordingly, this symbiotic6
relationship links the two groups, Vietnamese refugees and West Germans, based on a
common history as victims of predatory governments. Establishing common histories or
shared beliefs is an essential phase in the emergence of national consciousness (see
Confino, 1997) and as Bui (2003) argues, the validity of this commonality is “less
relevant than the conviction that it encapsulates past experiences which indelibly affects
the present” (p. 86).
By focusing on the expulsion of the Aussiedler instead of the persecuted Jews, it
shifts the national identity of West Germany away from the aggressive agenda of
National Socialism and the horrors of the Holocaust. The parallel narratives between the
Aussiedler and the Vietnamese evoke a positive German nation in the sense that shows a
6

Symbiotic because both groups benefitted from the relationship: West Germans’ interactions
with Vietnamese refugees help renew their national identity and the Vietnamese refugees benefitted from
West Germany’s willingness to resettle Vietnamese asylum-seekers.
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compassionate and empathetic German national character. To bolster this perception,
West Germany admitted almost one million Aussiedler in the years of 1951 and 1978 on
top of its resettlement commitments to the Indochinese refugees (Bui, 2003, p. 104).
Thus, the Vietnamese/Aussiedler comparison forges a common memory for two different
groups of people that points to their history as refugees and persecution. As Bui (2003)
suggests, the integration of Vietnamese boat people into German society engenders a
“unique situation of living among strangers and being considered a stranger [which]
entails an encounter the Other that demands a constant definition of the Self” (p. 86).
It is because of this cognizance of their mutual victimhood that strengthens West
Germany’s humanitarian duties to the Vietnamese refugees, which in turn reproduces a
positive post-Hitler German national identity. In the end, West Germany’s
representations of the Vietnamese refugee group, what Bui (2003) calls an immigrant
origin narrative, as parallel to the plight of the Aussiedler (i.e., the national narrative)
suggests the state’s desire to reframe the national past in order to construct a national
future. The mutual struggles of the Vietnamese boat people and the ethnic German
Aussiedler become a conscious representation strategy for political elites to re-structure
the collective identity of the West German nation away from Nazism and maintain the
Germanness.
The Problem of Re-Unification
While national identity was a contentious matter in divided Germany, reunification did not relieve East-West differences in identity as believed by politicians (see
Brandt, 1969). In November of 1989, Germans on both sides called for the fall of the
Berlin Wall with East Germans chanting “Wir sind ein Volk! [We are the people!]” and
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West Germans replying “Wir auch! [So are we!”].” However just as the 1871 German
unification failed to settle competing internal ambitions and build an inclusive national
identity for all Germans, re-unified Germany followed the same pattern after the euphoria
of re-unification. To use Max Weber’s words, once the “honeymoon of unification is
over,” Germany faces several conflicting group interests (as cited in Bendix, 1964, p.
206). Given the speed of re-unification, former East Germans felt cheated of their history
and legacies of the GDR. After the Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, West
Germany incorporated7 the East German state and new Germany became official on
October 3, 1990. Effectively, new Germany is an expansion of West Germanness
eastward. Hence once the honeymoon phase wore off, eastern Germans resented western
domination and what began as national pride transformed into national self-doubt (Spohn,
1995, p. 114).
During the East-West split, the two German governments worked hard to
legitimate their separate national identities and sustain state sovereignty in the eyes of the
people as well as the international community. However, the eleven months between the
fall of the Berlin Wall and Unity Day were not long enough to expunge political,
economic, and cultural differences between the two Germanys. Since East Germany was
essentially colonized by West Germany, the division between Ossis (Easterners) and
Wessis (Westerners) was a contentious debate in the years following re-unification.
Gordon Charles Ross (2002) contends that West Germany’s absorption of the East has
led to a one-sided process of nation building in which eastern Germans are seen as
second-class citizens. Within this “one-sided nation building,” re-unification has

7

Albert Hirschman (1993) observes that geschluckt (swallowed) was the word most often used to
describe German re-unification.
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obligated East Germans to reconsider their identity within a socio-political milieu defined
by West Germans (Ross, 2002, p. 69). Similarly, Sutherland (2010) argues, “In looking at
how the ‘imagined community’ finds its expression in unified Germany, there are
indications that contemporary nation-building ideology has not incorporated four decades
of separate GDR statehood as an equally constituent part of national identity” (p. 56).
Consequently, western Germans saw eastern Germans as Jammerossis (moaning
Easties) who relentlessly carp about their unfair treatment in re-unified Germany and to
eastern Germans, western Germans are stereotyped as Besserwessis (know-it-all Westies)
who have basically removed GDR relics from German history8 (Grix, 2002, pp. 2-3). In
the 2007 survey conducted by Der Spiegel to commemorate 18 years since the fall of the
Berlin Wall, 60% of eastern German respondents in the 14 to 24 years old age bracket
believe that it is “bad that nothing has remained of the things one could be proud of in
East Germany” (Spiegel, 2007). On the flipside, it is because of such sentiments that
prompt questions about eastern Germans’ sense of belonging in the new German
landscape. Yet the survey also shows that this Ostalgie (a conflation of the German
words East and nostalgia) or a nostalgic longing for the GDR past is an overstated
buzzword as 59% of the eastern German youth respondents and 51% of the older eastern
German responds (35-50 years old) said they would prefer to live on the western side if
the Wall was built again (Spiegel, 2007; see Grix, 2002).

8

According to the Spiegel survey, 49% of older western Germans and 50% from the west German
youth said that they do not know much about East German history, politics, culture, society, and how
people lived with only 5% of the 35 to 50 years old western German respondents said they know very much
(Spiegel, 2007).
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Now with 25 years after re-unification, the Ossis-Wessis debate and the so-called
Mauer im Kopf (Wall in the head)9 thesis are almost irrelevant and persisting differences
between east and west point to socio-economic factors rather than identity politics, which
dominated in the previous decade (see Bangel, 2014; DW, 2015d; Economist, 2015d;
Noack, 2014; Smale, 2015). According to the Economist (2015d), German re-unification
is a success since the socio-economic differences in Germany (e.g., higher unemployment
rate noticeably higher on the eastern side) are “no more pronounced than the socioeconomic fault lines that cross Belgium, Italy, or Spain.” The DW (2015d) survey also
suggests that the east-west divide is no longer a significant factor in defining German
identity: 82% of the total respondents believe German re-unification is a “good example
for other countries” (e.g., Korea) while 73% says that re-unification “has been an overall
success.”
Overall, the German nation (conceptually) seems to have finally reached a point
of regularity and normalization after having failed the first unification attempt and
persisted through two World Wars, foreign occupation, Nazism, and the partition during
the Cold War. Thus, this is not hard to presume that contemporary German national
identity is a highly valuable object for the German people given the state’s continuity and
change. While some 58% of Germans between the ages of 18 to 29 feel that reunification “has not been completed yet,” they also overwhelmingly feel German reunification has been as success (79%) and certainly an exemplar for others (90%) (DW,
2015d). In short, Germans, cross-generationally, want to maintain and strengthen innere

9

In 2007, 28% of western German and 38% of eastern German youth respondents said there are
many differences between the older people in eastern and western Germany; and 49% older eastern
Germans and 38% older western Germans also believe there are differences between the older generation
(Spiegel, 2007).
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Einheit (inner unity) as well as national unity. Subsequently, the rest of this chapter
postulates the possibility of German disunity.
The next section attempts to show the opposite effect by analyzing Germany’s
response to the Mediterranean refugees. Considering that the Mediterranean crisis is still
progressing and policy debates continue to drag on, the following is an evaluation of the
crisis in its broadest sense instead of a policy-specific critique: why Germans have not
embraced the Mediterranean refugee group in the same manner as the Vietnamese group
from four decades ago. In respect to the Mediterranean crisis and the sources of refugee
flows, the following discussion uses the securitization literature to argue that refugees
from the Middle East and Africa are viewed as security threats to the unity of the German
nation, which consequently tests the capacity of the German state.
The Mediterranean Other: Refugees, Migrants, or Terrorists?
This section begins the discussion with a brief summary of the debates
surrounding Germany’s latest stance on the refugee crisis before assessing two possible
reasons for German anxiety over the Mediterranean10 refugee situation. The first argues
that nation building in the immediate years before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall
was a quick and an unsatisfactory compromise between East Germany’s ethno-cultural
style and the West’s more liberal concept of citizenship, which in the end left out the
third sector of German society, the Others, from dialogues about the direction of new
Germany. This means foreigners are the real losers of re-unification because they no

10

At the onset of the crisis, the use of Mediterranean was specific to sea routes via the
Mediterranean Sea but as the crisis protracted, Mediterranean applies to both land and sea routes.
FRONTEX lists eight main migratory routes with four sea ones (Western, West African, Central, and
Eastern Mediterranean) and four land routes (Apulia & Calabria, Eastern borders, Western Balkan, and the
circular route from Albania to Greece). See http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routesmap/
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longer serve a purpose in the national identity of new Germany. Xenophobia and rightwing extremism over the current refugee group (i.e., the new Other) evoke racist attacks
from the 1980s and 1990s against contract workers and asylum seekers. Furthermore, the
1993 constitutional reform asylum law helped to facilitate the current wave of
xenophobia and anti-foreigner sentiment through institutionalizing the idea that
foreigners are threats to national cohesion.
The second conjecture focuses on the growth of Islamophobia and terrorism
across Europe. Already perpetuating a pervasive image of Arab/Muslim communities
living in Europe, the European far-right political and social groups securitize refugees
and asylum seekers as terrorists based on their countries of origin. The conflation of
refugees as terrorists insists that the refugee-terrorist Other group is a state and national
security. In effect, discriminatory citizenship debates in Germany in the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries along with the political right’s denunciation of refugees
as terrorists exacerbate the crisis and protract possible solutions.
Merkel’s Special Path?
During the budget debate in the German Bundestag, Chancellor Angela Merkel
declares that Germany’s “sound financial position” and “good state of health” are
indicators of its ability to “respond to new challenges that occur suddenly”—that is, the
ongoing refugee crisis in Europe (“A Challenge For All,” 2015). According to the
Chancellor, Germany is helping the estimated 800,000 refugees and asylum seekers
expected to arrive in Germany this year. While reminding Germany not to shy away from
its duties, she also calls for a mandatory plan to fairly distribute refugees among all
European Member States (i.e., burden sharing), which hints that states can no longer set
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quotas to limit the number of refugees and asylum seekers coming to their country. Since
the refugee issue affects everyone and the German economy is robust enough to take in
more people without new borrowing, German leadership is indispensable for a European
solution. In her statement to the European Parliament, delivered days before the
Bundestag budget debate, Merkel hoped to make Germany’s open door an example for
the European Union (i.e., Open Europe). Europe is a community based on shared
commitments to “human dignity, rule of law, tolerance, respect for minorities and
solidarity” and in ignoring the refugee crisis means, Merkel says, “[W]e would be
abandoning our values and thereby losing our identity. If we forget that, we betray
ourselves” (“Statement by Chancellor Angela Merkel,” 2015).
Urging Europeans to recall their identity, Merkel claims, “if we remember it, we
will manage to pass this historical test and will … emerge stronger from this crisis than
we went into it” (“Statement by Chancellor Angela Merkel,” 2015). In the end, she
confirms that the international community expects Europe to stand up to the values and
principles enshrined in the EU’s founding treaties. Fittingly, commentaries and editorials
in the following weeks praise Merkel as “brave, decisive and right” whose leadership is a
“shining exception” for other EU politicians (Economist, 2015c). Fareed Zakaria (2015)
calls Merkel’s open door policy as “Germany’s road to redemption” referencing
Germany’s role in Holocaust and World War II (cf. Hockenos, 2015). Others have
likened her to “an angel of mercy” and her humane refugee policy is a lesson for all (Chu,
2015; Hutton, 2015).
Amid international approvals, Merkel’s open door policy is more divisive than
progressive within national and supranational politics. Opinion polls show approval
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ratings for Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) have dropped to this year’s
lowest at 38% and even CDU party members are critical of her open door refugee party
(Sirleschtov, 2015). Perhaps Merkel has promised something Germany cannot deliver as
German states are struggling to cope with the “staggering scale” of the government’s
“refugee project” and frustrated about government inability to keep up with the rate of
new arrivals (Horn, 2015). Besides, the French President François Hollande is Merkel’s
only ally on the European level.11 Eastern Europeans are particularly reproachful of her
open door policy with the Hungarian PM accusing Merkel of “moral imperialism”
(Bender, 2015; see Abé et al., 2015). With Britain debating the possibility of a Brexit
(British exit) from the EU, Der Spiegel remarks, “Merkel has now embarked on her own
special path” (Abé et al., 2015).
Despite faltering public support in Germany, the rhetoric of Merkel’s open door
policy is not unheard of in German and European history or even in Western discourse of
universal human rights. Merkel urges that Europeans must respect the people who have
come to their borders seeking protection as “human beings and not as an anonymous
mass” because like the refugees today, she and others from Central and Eastern Europe
had also “pin[ned] their hopes and aspirations [on] a free and united Germany and
Europe” in search of better and brighter future 25 years ago (“Statement by Chancellor
Angela Merkel,” 2015). This gravitational pull is part of the European historical memory
and as Europeans had overcame the challenges of East-West divide and the Eurozone
crisis, Merkel stresses that Europeans can do it again if they are bold and unified.
From German partition to divisions in Europe, Merkel draws compelling
motivations for European solidarity in resolving this “test of historic proportions.” Aside
11

Merkel’s October 7th statement the European Parliament was a joint session with Hollande.
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from European cohesion, Merkel firmly believes that it is Europe’s duty to assist the
refugees and asylum seekers from Syria, Libya, and other war-torn countries. Whether or
not asylum seekers are permitted to stay (hinting at economic migrants falsely claiming
asylum), Europeans should at least uphold their promises to shelter refugees and process
asylum applications—“We owe that to them, the refugees, and to ourselves” (“Statement
by Chancellor Angela Merkel,” 2015). While Europeans criticize Merkel for this sudden
shift to idealism, driven by empathy rather than her usual cautious calculation, that
wishes to turn Germany into Europe’s moral superpower, her admirers applause her bold
move as the right step toward a resolution to the crisis with some Germans wish it had
came sooner (Abé et al., 2015; Economist, 2015c; McGregor, 2015).
Merkel and her supporters see the open door refugee policy as concurrent with the
goals and values of the European Union. For example, Article 18 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights12 qualifies the right to asylum as core EU law in addition to the
conditions set forth in the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the
status of refugees. Further, the UN’s principle of non-refoulement (Article 33.1 of the
Geneva Convention13) is affirmed in Article 19.2 of the Charter and Article 78.1 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).14 On this conviction, the refugee crisis is
seen as an existential threat because without a plan for burden sharing, the EU risks
physical disintegration (e.g., Brexit) as well as its identity (i.e., Europeanness). As such,
Merkel declares, “If Europe fails on the question of refugees, it won’t be the Europe we
12

Charter of Fundamental Rights on the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01.

13

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Signed 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April
1954) 189 UNTS 137.
14

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ

C326/47.
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wished for” (McGregor, 2015). Likewise, she refuses to apologize for Germany’s open
door refugee policy for that “would not be my country” (Abé et al., 2015).
New Germany for Germans Only?
Standing behind her open door refugee policy, Merkel says she is proud of how
far modern Germany has progressed: “I am happy that Germany too has become a
country that gives many people hope […] And if you look at your history, that is
something of tremendous value” (Merkel, as cited in Abé at el., 2015). In spite of the
many strides new Germany has taken to distance itself from the past, the debate over
Merkel’s refugee policy has revealed that re-unified new Germany is still not ready for an
inclusive German identity, one beyond the East-West divide.
As such, the real losers of re-unification are the Ausländer, the so-called
foreigners who have lived and worked in Germany for decades but did not qualify as
naturalized citizens because they are “not in the best interest of the German culture” (as
cited in Mushaben, 2010, p. 143). Thus the ultra-nationalist sentiments and the general
feeling of Überfremdung (foreign infiltration) that color the refugee policy in Germany
are legacies of the politics of re-unification in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. In spite of the commonly held belief that xenophobia is a byproduct of the
GDR regime but West Germany also contributed to perpetuating racist undertones of
modern German national identity.
The refugee debate has given PEGIDA, as well as other right wing movements
such as the blog group Political Incorrect (PI) and the political party Alternative for
Germany (AfD), a platform to regenerate mass support for securitizing refugee issues.
Essentially, the Mediterranean crisis is inadvertently a facilitating condition for the
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securitization of asylum. Since then, politicians and political pundits have noted a
growing hatred in the Germany, a return of the dark side of Germany, a return of the ugly
German (see Amann at el., 2015a & 2015b; Hockenos, 2015; Spiegel, 2015). The number
of registered right wing criminal instances (173) within the first half of this year have
increased almost three-fold compared to the same time frame last year with total
xenophobic-related attacks totaling over 500 cases (Hockenos, 2015). Additionally,
between January and June of 2015 racist attacks on refugee centers and asylum seeker
hostels were a daily occurrence (Hockenos, 2015; Spiegel, 2015). Aside from directly
attacking refugees or what many politicians see as an “attack on our [German] society”
(Heiko Mass, as cited in Spiegel, 2015), right-wing extremists have targeted politicians
whom they deemed as “enemies of the German state”15 (see Amann at el., 2015b).
Overall, Germany’s “growing hate problem” or its “new culture of hate” is not a recent
phenomenon caused by Merkel’s open refugee policy but rather, Merkel’s refugee policy
provided a platform for the re-emergence of the same xenophobia that emerged under reunification.
While racist attacks happened before Die Wende and on both sides, these attacks
garnered national attention between 1989 and 1990 as Germany prepared for reunification. The emphasis on re-unification is not to suggest re-unification caused the
xenophobic hostility but rather, re-unification created the socio-political climate to
sustain anti-foreigner sentiments (Ausländerfeindlichkeit). In the years leading to reunification, racist violence was mostly against foreign workers such as Vietnamese
contract workers in the East and Turkish guest workers in the West. Mushaben (2010)
15

Besides attacks and threats on Merkel, the most publicized incident was on Henriette Reker, a
pro-asylum independent candidate leading Cologne’s mayoral race, who got stabbed in the neck with a
hunting knife. She actually ended up winning the election.
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asserts that the “unprecedented wave” of xenophobia and level of racist violence during
the first three years of German unity, coinciding with the Yugoslav refugee crisis, was
unlike anything Europe has witnessed over the last twenty years even in the rise of antiimmigration populist parties in Britain, France, and Denmark (p. 143). While socioeconomics is one of the more accepted explanations for the mushrooming of xenophobia
in the early 1990s16 (see Alber, 1993; Bui, 2003; Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009,
chap. 14; Mushaben, 2010), economics is not the only explanation for the rise of
contemporary ultra-nationalist groups since the German economy is strong enough to
avoid economic competition between groups.
Other studies and explanations on the ultra-nationalist and xenophobic violence
during the re-unification years focus the attention on foreigners and not Germans (cf.
Mushaben, 2010). In general, politicians and analysts assume that anti-foreign hostility
increases as the foreign population increases and as a result, reducing the foreign
population to/in Germany will restore public order (Alber, 1993, p. 5).
Table 3: Right Wing Violence and Asylum Seekers in Germany, 1986-1993
Year
1993
1992
1991
1990*
1989
1988
1987
1986

# of Violent Acts
1,814
2,584
1,483
270
103
72
76
71

# of Asylum Seekers
322,600
438,190
256,110
193,065
121,320
103,075
57,380
99,650

Violent Acts: 1,000 Asylum Seekers
5.62
5.90
5.80
1.40
0.85
0.70
1.32
0.71

* Numbers for 1990 to 1993 are from re-unified Germany while 1986 to 1989 are data from West Germany.
Source: Alder (1993) & Eurostat, online data code (migr_asyctz).
16

The economic burdens of re-unification hit eastern Germans around 1992 and western Germans
was already dealing with Helmut Kohl’s Solidaritätszuschlag (solidarity tax), which was implemented in
1991 to help support development in eastern Germany. The economic recession provided impetus for antiforeign resentment as the German economy failed to supply enough jobs for the demand. Further, right
wing radicals claimed that foreigners (particularly asylum seekers) are exploiting the German welfare state.
This idea, according to Alber (1993), serves as “a legitimizing bridge that helps to redefine anti-foreign
violence as legitimate self-defense” (p. 4).
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Table 3 shows the total number of right wing violence against the number of asylum
seekers to West Germany in the years of 1986 and 1989 and re-unified Germany, from
1990 through 1993. While the data show an apparent trend between violent attacks and
asylum seekers, public opinion surveys show a slight inconsistency in the interpretation
of the relationship between xenophobic sentiments and the presence of foreigners.
Duncan Cooper (2012) uses a series of survey questions conducted by the
research institute TNS Emnid in 1993 to show that only a minuscule percentage of the
respondents held xenophobic attitudes yet, 69% of them responded they understand why
others might have something against foreigners coming to Germany (pp. 356-357). For
example, only 2% of the respondents were willing to shout “Ausländer raus! [Foreigners
out!]” during a demonstration (TNS Emnid, 1993, as cited in Cooper, 2012, p. 356). On
the other hand, the 1993 survey shows 45% of eastern German and 58% of western
German respondents believed the government’s policies towards foreigners are too
lenient (as cited in Cooper, 2012, p. 357).
Cooper (2012) concludes that xenophobia is not entrenched in German identity
but rather an unfortunate effect of the socio-economic changes within the state. In
general, Germans are irritated by the increase number of foreigners (i.e., Germany as a
country of immigration) and the state’s poor economic conditions further stress this
sentiment but not to the extent of extreme intolerance and xenophobia. The TNS Emnid
(1993) survey data is also supportive of Weil’s (1997) assertion that while Germans are
anxious about the asylum issue, the economy, and a general degradation of the German
state, which increases their propensity to support right wing political parties, but
democracy remains consistent. In his words, “Indeed, democratic values were
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surprisingly strong, even in eastern Germany after a 40-year experience of communism
and a dozen years of Nazism” and suggests that extremism is a reaction to or a protest
against worsening economic and political conditions (Weil, 1997, p. 113). Moreover, he
argues that the extent in which xenophobia and right wing extremism increased with
German re-unification is actually part of a general trend across Europe, not exclusive to
Germany (Weil, 1997, p. 120; see also Alber, 1993, pp. 5-7).
However, this does not negate national identity as an element driving xenophobia
as there are a lot of missing data and raw frequencies do not offer much explanatory
value to such a complex social question. Not to mention, there are contradictions between
raw data and survey data. According to Alber (1993), the dual increase in asylum seekers
and violent acts is an aberration, associated with the government turnovers, since there
are discrepancies between the supposedly constant relationship between foreigners and
anti-foreigner violence (p. 7, also see graphs 6 & 7). Therefore, German re-unification
created a turbulent backdrop that catalyzes the already continuous intergroup relations,
the Germans against the foreigner Others.
Therefore, xenophobia is an outgrowth of the pressure of re-nationalization, of the
need to create an identity that could unite both East and West Germans in new Germany.
In order to produce a common feeling of Germanness, a We-identity that weds a divided
nation, the newly re-united German state adopted the same Othering tactic that was used
to distinguish between East and West Germans. Consequently the search for a common
identity between Germans, the re-unification phase represents a revival of the traditional
ethno-cultural oriented understanding of national identity. Spohn (1995) describes
national sentiments during re-unification as a “novel German patriotism connected with
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some romantic undertones and some self-assertive overtones” (p. 114). In other words,
the re-unification movement promoted the idea of a primordial German nation based on
shared ethnic and cultural origins, which goes against democratic goals under reunification (Mushaben, 2010, p. 144; cf. Weil, 199717).
In this definition of the new collective German identity, Germans are the in-group
and foreigners represent the out-group. This is especially troubling for new Germany as it
directly challenges the same liberal democratic values that are the foundation of the
Federal Republic and ironically, something it seeks to produce in the former East
Germany. Alan Cowell, writing in 1995, summarized this paradox as: “[T]he agenda of
the far right – summed up in its slogan, ‘Foreigners go home’ – is being fulfilled by a
Government that says it seeks social peace and justice.” Cowell’s (1995) article concerns
the mass expulsion of Vietnamese migrant workers (i.e., former contract workers) and
their struggle to stay in a country that many considered their second home; and
furthermore, after the fall of communism in Europe, the Vietnamese government refused
to take back their citizens (see also Bui, 2003, pp. 133-136).
The mass deportation of Vietnamese migrant workers in re-united Germany is
part of the Federal Republic’s larger program of integration and normalization between
East and West. Yet its aim of transplanting democracy in the former East Germany

17

Frederick Weil (1997) offers an interesting read on the wave of racism and xenophobia in the
years following 1989 using opinion surveys. He argues that the media had exaggerated the problem and
survey data supports his hypothesis. Instead of weakened democracy and higher ethnic tension, his analysis
shows the opposite. There were no changes to democracy level before/after re-unification nor significant
differences between East and West, even suggests that democracy on the eastern side is slightly stronger
than western Germany. Moreover, there were no significant increases in ethnic intolerance in re-unified
Germany. He explains the slight increase in West German attitudes correlate with a larger European trend.
Regardless of what the statistical results indicate, Weil does not provide a comprehensive answer to the
general foreigner question since his analysis is based on anti-Semitism. By explicitly asking about Jews,
Weil ignores other non-German groups as well as most Germans might respond more positively giving the
recent Holocaust history.
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(catching up with western standards) during re-unification involves sacrificing quality
(i.e., genuine democracy) for quantity by spreading democracy to Germans in the former
GDR—essentially, trading long-term goals for short-term benefits (cf. Weil, 1997). This
marks a shift in East-West relations for West Germany had denounced the GDR for its
inhumane treatment of the Vietnamese contract workers, especially their deliberate
isolation from society and the perception of contract workers as labor power rather than
human beings (see Bui, 2003, chap. 3).18 Accordingly, re-unification should improve
conditions for foreign laborers under re-unification but instead, the Federal Republic took
the opposite approach and assisted in the deportation of contract workers as their
foreignness stood in the way of internal unity of the German nation (see Cowell, 1995).
Likewise, the Federal Republic also exhibits similar discriminatory practices in its
process of purifying the German nation. While East Germany deported contract workers,
West Germany placed restrictions on asylum to cut down on the foreigner to German
ratio.19 As asylum law and refugees are malleable to the discretion of political leaders and
the interests of the state, Germany’s 1949 asylum provision is not as innocently liberal as
widely acknowledged since it had a strategic purpose in the reconstruction of the West
German nation-state. Article 16.2 of West Germany’s 1949 Basic Law (Constitution)
prohibits the extradition of German nationals and stipulates, “Persons persecuted for
political reasons enjoy the right of asylum.” The face value of this article is exceptionally
liberal as asylum is an absolute right for all who suffered political persecution.

18

This criticism is also true for Turkish guest workers in West Germany. For discussion, see
Wilhelm (2013).
19

The TNS Emnid (1993) survey shows 17% of western German and 12% of eastern German
respondents are “unhappy with the numerical relationship between Germans and foreigners in their
residential area” (16% total respondents). For discussion, see Cooper (2012, p. 356).
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In its historical context, however, the 1949 asylum policy was not nearly as
revolutionary in terms of humanitarianism. As (West) Germany’s first constitution after
Hitler, the 1949 Basic Law intended to renew the German nation-state by grounding it in
democratic principles (see Hailbronner, 1994; Poutrus, 2014). Thusly, Article 16.2
qualifies asylum as a basic right for all persons fleeing political persecution concurs with
West Germany’s renewal of itself as a nation of civic morals and democratic values. In
another way, the generous 1949 asylum law is West Germany’s approach for dealing the
Nazi past where the state internalizes20 moral and political responsibility for the events of
the Holocaust and the obligation to reconstruct the post-war German state rooted in
democracy in order to prevent the repeat of history.
In any case, Article 16.2 in the 1949 constitution was not created solely because
West Germans have an altruistic desire to provide protection for the politically
persecuted. For instance, the complementary Asylum Ordinance (1953), which provides
the legal procedures for the asylum process, was not effective until three years after the
implementation of the Basic Law. The 1953 Asylum Ordinance, historically rooted in the
Nazi’s 1938 Police Decree on Foreigners (Ausländerpolizeiverordnung), was highly
restrictive, did not say much on asylum, and gave local immigration police authorities the
power to accept or reject an application (Poutrus, 2014, pp. 119-120). Thus the law on the
books ensured the right to asylum for all persecuted persons but in practice, local
immigration police used the provision to prevent foreigners from entering West

20

This comes from M. Rainer Lepsius’s (1989) classification of how Austria, East Germany, and
West Germany dealt with the Nazi past. Unlike West Germany’s internalization, Austria externalized
fascism/Nazism as a German responsibility by claiming Austrians as Hitler’s first victims. Lastly, East
Germany universalized the Nazi past by adopting socialism’s anti-fascist tradition.
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Germany. Even during the Cold War when Germany’s asylum law became truly liberal,
it was a hesitant21 byproduct of anti-Communism.
Irrespective of the law’s gradual liberalization during the Cold War, asylum was
hotly debated, especially in terms of preventing unwanted foreigners and asylum abuse.
This resulted in the Alien Act of 1965, which basically gave authorities to apply the law
“as liberally as necessary and as restrictively as possible” (Poutrus, 2014, p. 127; see also
Ansay, 1991). By the 1980s, the discourse was framed around anti-foreigner anxieties
and xenophobic violence. Ultimately, legal developments and interpretations of asylum
that wavers between humanitarian protection of the politically persecuted and selfdefense against the foreign Other demonstrate that asylum in Germany relates to concepts
of the nation and national identity.
Therefore, the 1993 asylum law reform is in line with new Germany’s search for a
collective identity to unite both East and West Germans. Consequently, re-unification
reverted to the “very same ethnically-oriented policies towards foreigners” that
characterized the pre-1949 constitution—that is, the romanticized, organic, and superior
German national character (Poutrus, 2014, p. 118). The ideal German nation is conceived
as a homogenous community of people united by ethno-cultural elements. Similar to the
its first unification in 1871, Germany’s second unification process did not transform the
German people and culture into a “nation of citizens” (Staatsburgernation) based on
“equality of civil rights and the procedure of democratic legitimation of rule by the
citizens” (Lepsius, 1985, p. 58). Instead, re-unified Germany, like the German Empire in
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In spite of Cold War politics, the West German government made excuses for why the state
cannot handle any more refugees. Eventually West Germany compromised and took in Hungarian refugees
but based on a hierarchical classification, which was intended to expedite the asylum process but actually
violated the integrity of the asylum law. See Poutrus (2014, p. 121).
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the nineteenth century, was constituted as “a folk and cultural nation unified as a state”
(Lepsius, 1985, p. 60).
While nation building entails group unity and cohesion but Germany’s strict
pursuit of national homogeneity understood as ethno-cultural solidarity is more
destructive than integrative. Given the amount of non-Germans living within the German
state, demographic realities make it difficult to presume a homogenous German people
and maintain a democratic polity with civil rights among citizens. According to
Klusmeyer and Papdemetriou (2009), Germany’s anti-pluralist version of national
homogeneity denies the process of “negotiation, contestation, and revision” upon which
national identities are constructed. Instead of a middle ground, Germany’s anti-pluralist
variant distinguishes between inclusion and exclusion.
In the hype of xenophobic attacks and poor economic conditions during the
institutional transfer of re-unification, the asylum debate was used to restructure the
identity of the new German nation, which also appeased citizen demands (see Avery,
1983, pp. 277-289; Minkenberg, 2004). In addition to heightened right wing violence
against foreigners, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw a large increase in the number of
asylum seekers to Germany. The growing stock of non-Germans living in Germany
intensifies resentment and deep distrust, which was carried over from extremist distortion
of migrant laborers. Within this context, the asylum debate in 1992/1993 centered on the
issue of asylum abuse (i.e., the belief that refugees are actually economic migrants taking
advantage of the German system) instead of Überfremdung, which then posits Germany
as a democratic state defending its liberal welfare system while it takes a more restrictive
stance on immigration and foreigners.

72

Yet the 1993 asylum policy is a drastic change from the unqualified right in the
1949 version. Now the right of asylum is conditional with the introduction of the safe
third country clause in the second paragraph. The 1993 asylum reform stands as the
current policy in the German Basic Law as Article 16a:
[1] Persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum.
[2] Paragraph (1) of this Article may not be invoked by a person who enters the
federal territory from a member state of the European Communities or from
another third state in which application of the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms is assured. […] In the cases specified in the first
sentence of this paragraph, measures to terminate an applicant’s stay may be
implemented without regard to any legal challenge that may have been
instituted against them.
The safe third clause redefined the process of seeking asylum as an unencumbered direct
flight from point A (political persecution) to point B (Germany) and restricts the number
of people who can claim asylum based on the first paragraph of Article 16a.
Germany’s concept of safe states works in conjunction with the EU’s Dublin
regulation22 that addressed the issue of “asylum shopping” to reduce the number of
applicants in Germany as it forces asylum seekers to apply for asylum in the first safe
country of arrival (Klusmeyer & Papademetriou, 2009, p. 208). Furthermore, the last
sentence in the second paragraph authorizes the rejection and deportation of asylum
seekers regardless of pending appeals if they were found to have passed through a
designated safe third state23 (Hailbronner, 1994, p. 162; see also Noll, 1997).

22

See Regulation (EU) 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) [2013] OJ L180/31.
23

Aside from EU Member States, Germany’s list of safe third states includes Ghana, Senegal,
Serbia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kosovo, Albania, and Montenegro are recent additions to the
list. See, Hockenos (2015) and http://dw.com/p/1G6c6
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The impact of the new asylum policy is evident of the government’s underlying
motives as the number of asylum applications dropped after 1993 with numbers as low as
19,165 applications in 2007 (see Tables 3 & 4). In the end, the safe third state concept
buffers Germany from unwanted foreigners by either listing origin country as a safe
country of origin or a safe third country (see Cooper, 2012, p. 343). More importantly,
reducing the number of asylum seekers in Germany help to pacify East-West political
tensions and identity differences accrued during Cold War Germanys. The 1993 asylum
reform is indicative of the ethnicization of Germanness in post-Wall Germany (see Alber,
1993; Clark & Legge, 1997; Faist, 1994; Green, 2001). As opinion surveys revealed that
69% of western Germans and 63% of eastern Germans supported the safe third state
clause (as cited in Cooper, 2012, p. 343), national identity in twenty-first century
Germany is contingent on the exclusion of the foreign Other.
Table 4: Asylum Applications in Germany, 2008-2014
New Applicants
% of EU-28

2008
21,325
13.95

2009
27,575
14.08

2010
41,245
19.94

2011
45,680
17.36

2012
64,410
23.15

2013
109,375
29.33

2014
172,945
30.74

Asylum Applicants
% of EU-28

26,845
11.92

32,910
12.47

48,475
18.69

53,235
17.23

77,485
23.11

126,705
29.39

202,645
32.32

Source: Eurostat, online data code (migr_asyappctza).

Thus as German nationalism returns to its ethno-cultural roots, refugees and
migrants become threats to national identity. In the public’s collective memory, the
present refugee crisis and the increasing asylum applicants lodged in Germany since 2008
(Table 4) incite the same fears and anxiety as the experiences during the 1980s and
1990s. In effect, re-unification has established foreign groups, regardless of humanitarian
concerns, as sources of societal and political insecurity in Germany. Asylum seekers are
parasitic migrants trying to take advantage of Germany’s liberal social services while
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migrants generally evoke images of illicit activities and criminals. Thus Merkel’s open
door policy is considered as an invitation for social breakdown (see Abé et al., 2015;
Bender, 2015).
Moreover, proponents of Mekel’s open door policy insinuate the refugee question
as an existential crisis for the EU: “Is it more important to save refugees or to save the
EU, which itself embodies an answer to the horrors of wars?” (Abé et al., 2015). Just as
Hungarian PM Orban charges Germany of moral imperialism in Europe’s refugee crisis,
Der Spiegel reports that Merkel’s calls for an open door policy is not merely on behalf of
Germany but the entire European continent. Thus Merkel’s refugee policy has the
potential to end her chancellorship as either a hero who fought for an honorable cause or
one who is responsible for disintegrating re-unified Germany as well as the European
Union (see Abé et al., 2015; Hockenos, 2015; Schnee, 2015).
Blurred Lines: Between Refugees and Terrorists?
In the German public broadcasting network ARD’s first Deutschland Trend
survey, conducted at the end of August 2015, 38% of the participants responded “Yes – It
scares me that so many refugees are coming to Germany” but by early October 2015, the
second survey reveals that 51% of the respondents are “worried that so many refugees are
coming to Germany” (as cited in DW, 2015f). Regionally, respondents from the former
East Germany are more anxious (from 46% to 59%) than respondents in the former West
(from 36% to 48%). As the German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere notes, the shift
in German attitudes towards refugees reflects a change in attitudes among the refugees
themselves:
Until the summer, the refugees were thankful to be here. They asked where is the
police station, where are the federal offices, where will you send us. Now there
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are many refugees who think they can choose where they go. They strike because
they do not like the accommodation; they cause problems because they do not like
the food. (As cited in DW, 2015f)
This statement shows that when the Mediterranean crisis first made headlines,
German civil society was more sympathetic because the refugees were seen as victims
but as the number of people coming to Europe increased, Germans took a more defensive
outlook. Now, incoming refugees are depicted as rowdy mobs of people without any
regards for appropriate social conduct norms and ungrateful for the host country’s
hospitality (see Fund, 2015; Glum, 2015; Melchior, 2015). Relating to the previous
section, the current refugee group as envisioned here is even more perilous to the security
of the German nation as the refugee threat transformed from an ontological threat to
German national identity in the previous section to existentially threatening the German
nation.
In other words, Mediterranean refugees have transgressed from a passive group in
distress to an active group with agency asserting demands from host governments. This
depiction is further problematized when origin countries are taken into account, which
suggests that anti-refugee sentiments are manifestations of the paranoia of terrorism.
Within a migration-security nexus, Merkel’s open door refugee policy is an opportunity
for terrorists to undermine state security (Hockenos, 2015). Table 5 (below) is a
comparison of the top ten refugee-producing countries in the Mediterranean crisis and
end of the year asylum trends in the EU-28 with corresponding dominant terrorist
organizations as designated by the UN Security Council.
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Table 5: A Comparison of Europe’s Refugee Crisis & UN List of Terrorist Groups
Mediterranean Sea Arrivals 20151
Top-10 Origin
Share
Syria
52
Afghanistan
19
Iraq
6
Eritrea
5
Nigeria
2
Pakistan
2
Somalia
2
Sudan
1
Gambia
1
Bangladesh
1
Selected Terrorist Groups
al-Ittihad al-Islamia
al-Qaeda
Ansar al-Islam
Taibah International4
East Turkestan Islamic Movement4
Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Harakat ul-Mujahidin
Islamic Jihad Union/Group4
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan456
Jamiat Ihya at-Turaz al-Islami
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
al-Shabaab4
Boko Haram5
Islamic State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS)
Taliban

EU-28 Asylum Trends 2014
Top-10 Origin Share Top-10 Applicants in Germany
Syria
21.1
Syria
39,332
Serbia
9.6
Serbia2
24,080
Afghanistan
6.7
Eritrea
13,198
Eritrea
6.4
Afghanistan
9,115
Pakistan
3.7
Albania
7,865
Nigeria
3.3
Bosnia & H.
5,705
Albania
2.8
Macedonia3
5,614
Russia
2.7
Somalia
5,528
Somalia
2.7
Various
5,406
Stateless
2.7
Iraq
5,345
Base & Suspected Areas of Operations
Somalia, Eritrea
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Syria
Iraq, Syria
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Central Asia
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan, Albania
Pakistan, Afghanistan
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia
Pakistan, Afghanistan
Pakistan, Afghanistan
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh
Pakistan, Afghanistan
Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan
Nigeria
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Nigeria
Pakistan, Afghanistan

1

As of October 2015
Serbia and Kosovo (S/RES/1244 (1999))
3
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
4
Associated with al-Qaeda
5
Associated with ISIS
6
Associated with Taliban
Source: UNHCR, Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response – Mediterranean Data Portal & Asylum Trends, 2014; UN Security
Council’s al-Qaeda Sanctions List, see S/RES/1267/1999 (15 October 1999), S/RES/1333/2000 (19 December 2000), &
S/RES/1989/2011 (17 June 2011).
2

While it seems true that the Mediterranean boat refugees are possibly linked to
terrorist groups given the presence of major terrorist organizations in their countries of
origin, which would justify Germany’s terrorist fears, but that obscures the complex
relationship between refugee/asylum and terrorism within international legal-political
agreements. For instance, the 1951 Geneva Convention rationalizes that anyone who has
committed war crimes, crimes against peace and humanity, “a serious non-political crime
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outside the country of refuge,” or acts that contradicts UN principles are excluded from
the asylum and rights provided under the Geneva Convention.24 Before 9/11, Article 1F
of the Geneva Convention, the exclusion clause, was rarely used; and when the clause
was used, the norm is “include and only then exclude” (Bhat, 2014, pp. 315-316). In
other words, a person’s application is considered first for refugee status under the
provisions of Article 1A of the Convention and only when there are no evidences of
persecution based on well-founded fear, then it is appropriate to pursue the exclusion
clause under Article 1F. After 9/11, however, the scope and application of Article 1F
increased exponentially as the “underlying assumption is that terrorists are misusing the
asylum systems” (Bhat, 2014, p. 317).
In addition to the expansion of the exclusion clause, the UN Security Council has
set misleading links between asylum and terrorism. For example, Resolution 137325 calls
upon all states to in the third paragraph:
[f] Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national
and international law, including international standards of human rights, before
granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not
planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;
[g] Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by
perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political
motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition
of alleged terrorists …
In this manner, Resolution 1373 presumes that the September 11 attacks happened
because the U.S. was negligent in granting refugee status to the perpetrators (Bhat, 2014,
p. 317). Moreover, subparagraph [g] insinuates that counterterrorism and state interests

24

See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Signed 28 July 1951, entered into force 22
April 1954) 189 UNTS, art. 1F.
25

See S/RES/1373/2001 (28 September 2001).
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take priority over the basic human rights of alleged terrorists. In order to protect the
sanctity of asylum and international humanitarianism, UN Security Council Resolution
1373 calls upon states to take whatever means necessary against international terrorism
because it threatens peace and security of the international order. Accordingly, not only
are qualified persons denied asylum but also innocent individuals who match a specific
profile are incriminated as terrorists (see Avdan, 2014, p. 459; Bhat, 2014; Milton,
Spencer, & Findley, 2013).
The Mediterranean refugees are unfortunate victims of the “age of terrorism” as
the September 11 attacks have led to an easy conflation of Arab/Muslim refugees as
terrorists. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres warned the
international community about the dangers of confusing “legitimate security concerns
and the need to fight terror, with migration, asylum or refugees” (as cited in Spindler,
2005). Thusly, refugees are actually the opposite of terrorists for they usually are the first
victims of terror (Guterres, as cited in Spindler, 2005). Yet the European Union has not
come to a consensus for a comprehensive plan to resolve Europe’s largest population
transfer since the Second World War. Unlike the Indochinese refugees, heightened
measures against terrorism enables extremist groups to negatively construct the
Mediterranean group. Since 9/11, state security and national interests have triumphed
over human rights and hence, asylum admissions policies are ever more restrictive and
selective (Avdan, 2014; Bhat, 2014).
With the hysteria of the U.S.-led global war on terror and Islamist terrorist attacks
across Europe, it is not inconceivable for Germans to construct Mediterranean refugees as
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terrorists.26 Yet that view does not yield worthwhile solutions to the terrorist question or
the refugee one. For one, that perception is an inaccurate account of the realities of the
Mediterranean crisis. The UNHCR (2015a) reports that 85% of the Mediterranean boat
people come from the world’s top ten refugee-producing countries. Also, Syrians make
up the largest group of asylum seekers in the Mediterranean figures as well as in the EU28 and Germany. The Mediterranean crisis is, by definition, a refugee crisis since at least
52% of sea arrivals are Syrians fleeing persecution and civil violence, a point the
Commissioner has expressed earlier this year in July (UNHCR, 2015c).
Contrary to the logic of Merkel’s open door policy, Nazli Avdan (2014)
concludes that host states are more inclined to tighten asylum admissions if they had
experiences with terrorist attacks on home soil or against their citizens (e.g., the Munich
massacre in 1972). Whereas the Avdan (2014) study holds host states neutral in their
interactions with the refugee population, Milton et al. (2013) posit that host states are
participants in the radicalization of refugees as their study shows poorly kept refugee
camps and ill treatment by host governments make refugees more susceptible to terrorist
radicalization. Perhaps, Maiziere’s observation of a shift in attitudes among asylum
seekers in Germany is actually a reflection of the dismal conditions of refugee centers
and/or inadequate supplies and facilities to accommodate new arrivals (see Milton et al.,
2013, p. 626; Grieshaber, 2015). Furthermore, increases in right wing violence against
foreigners can also deteriorate relations between Germans and asylum seekers. In just the
first Sunday of November 2015, six Syrian refugees were taken to the hospital for
injuries sustained from three separate attacks and not to mention numerous arsons on
26

Yet aside from the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France (January 2015), the train bombings in
Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005) are the only major Islamist attacks in Europe since 2001.
See http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/01/daily-chart-8
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refugee hostels (Grieshaber, 2015). So far this year, there were reports of more than 576
attacks against refugee centers, in contrast to last year’s total of 198 (Grieshaber, 2015).
In spite of this, Avdan’s (2014) study also found that humanitarian concerns
remain a strong factor in determining asylum decisions in the long run regardless of
increases in transnational terrorism (p. 464). While this is certainly a positive finding, the
question is how long before policies catch up with realities of the refugee crisis. Despite
her critics, Merkel’s open door refugee policy is steering the EU back on track for better
public policies towards newcomers and amend relations with Muslim/Arab minorities at
home. After all, securitization theory is a way of framing a political issue so that it
resonates with the public. When European leaders turn their backs on refugees and
asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia, it serves to vindicate the
anti-West ideology that terrorist organizations like ISIS promotes among their followers
and new recruits. Contrary to anti-foreigner protests and Islamophobia across the EU,
showing compassion and hospitality toward victims of terrorism is a more effective way
to defend and maintain national identity in Germany as well as the European Union.
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4. Conclusion
In light of Merkel’s open door refugee policy, internal pressures from her threeparty coalition have forced her to rethink whether Germany can cope with the rising flow
of refugees. Indeed, the Christian Social Union’s (CSU) ultimatum to end the 75-year
union with the Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) if she did not reconsider her
refugee policy. According to CSU leaders, Merkel’s liberal refugee policy and the
ensuing coalition crisis between the CSU/CDU have favored the far right and extremist
parties among German voters.1 Moreover, PEGIDA has also taken advantage of the
CSU/CDU crisis to pursue the group’s xenophobic agenda with demonstrations almost
every week since October.
In response to the Christian Democrats’ demands, Merkel has proposed new
polices to better control refugee flows but the Social Democrats (center-left) reject the
plan as key measures reinforces the idea of Fortress Germany. Merkel defended the
CSU’s continuous “transit zones” idea as a way to hasten the asylum process insofar as
authorities can screen, reject, and deport asylum seekers more efficiently; but for the
Social Democrats and pro-refugee organizations, transit zones are merely another way to
deny asylum and keep refugees out of legal German soil. Calling them “legal no-man’s
land,” the organization Pro Asyl explains, “Transit zones can only mean that they have to
install detention camps along the entire border with Germany, and possibly a fence” (as
cited in Knight, 2015).

1

Polls at the end of October show that CSU support among Bavarians was down to 43% while
support for the AfG increased to 9%. The CSU’s fear of competition from populist far right parties is
reminiscent of Franz-Josef Strauss’ political tactic in the 1980s, which insists that are no democratically
legitimate parties to the right of the CSU.
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The CSU/CDU’s new refugee proposals and its clear deviation from Merkel’s
earlier open door policy, the Mediterranean refugee crisis is now a crisis for the German
government and society. In Merkel’s open door policy, she rendered the refugee dilemma
as existentially threatening the core identity of Germany as well as the European
community. However, Merkel’s open door refugee plan received such harsh criticisms
from political elites that jeopardize the unity of the German nation and state.
Subsequently, the Mediterranean boat refugees are securitized as impending threats to
national disunity as German politicians advocate for restrictive asylum policies and
tighter border security.
While pro-asylum advocates want to draw upon the success of the Comprehensive
Plan of Action (CPA) and European solidarity during the Indochinese crisis as a model
for the current crisis, the German case study indicates that identity politics can drive
international humanitarianism. During the Cold War, the Vietnamese boat people offered
Germanys a way to reconstruct identity that could reconcile the German past and ensure a
future for both German nations. In short, the Vietnamese group was framed within
Germany’s national interests, whereas the Mediterranean boat refugees are not beneficial
to national unity. In spite of international laws and EU treaties, the Mediterranean
refugees are negatively constructed as threats to national security. Accordingly, moral
responsibilities are subsided in order to maintain the survival of the nation’s collective
identity.
Despite the naming and shaming from various state and non-state actors (e.g., the
UN, the U.S., and the media) for Germany’s lack of urgency, political elites continue to
portray the present group of refugees and asylum seekers as economic migrants seeking
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to exploit Germany’s political and social welfare system. Likewise, refugees are also
misconstrued as terrorists based on their countries of origins as a means of rendering
them ineligible for asylum. Thus, the discourse on the Mediterranean boat people denies
the right of asylum to genuine refugees and perpetuates the post-9/11 terrorist hysteria. It
also violates the non-discrimination clause (Article 3) of the Geneva Convention and
further vindicates that asylum varies across time and space as it suits national interests.
Without dismissing the negative externalities that refugee groups impose upon
host countries, it is actually in Germany’s national interests to welcome refugees and
asylum seekers since ignoring the crisis violates integral EU treaties that substantiates
how Member States should regard human rights, the right of asylum, and border controls.
As Merkel declared, if Germany forgets its shared values of human dignity, tolerance,
and solidarity, then it has already lost its identity. It is also in the Germany’s strategic
political interests to pursue a liberal refugee policy. First, in its willingness to
accommodate refugees and asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq works to
discredit the anti-West doctrine trumpeted in Islamic fundamentalism and suppresses
terrorist foreign fighters recruitment. Secondly, seeing as the EU has one of the lowest
fertility rates of the G-20 states and holds a progressively smaller share of the world’s
population for the younger age groups, it desperately needs more people within the
working age population, defined as those between 15 to 64 years old, to help pay for its
ageing population’s retirement funds and social services. Against dominant political
trends, the Mediterranean refugees and asylum seekers contribute to European security
and not insecurity. This necessitates that German political elites to consider the long-term
effects of refugees instead of proposing policies that merely satisfy short-term interests.
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